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By Ron A. Bouchard, Richard W. Hawkins, Robert Clark, Reidar
Hagtvedt, & Jamil Sawani *
I. INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

Global drug regulators have long privileged models of therapeutic product
development that provide strong intellectual property rights to pharmaceutical firms,
which are deemed necessary to offset large regulatory delays and the growing costs of
drug development. Patent and, increasingly, regulatory rights are assumed to be essential
for all stages of the therapeutic product lifecycle, including publicly-funded medical
research, university technology transfer, private research and development activities, the
regulatory submission cycle, and the post-market stage. Indeed, patent rights are seen to
be so important to the drug development exercise that drug patenting and drug approval
are now legally linked through a novel form of legal ordering referred to as “linkage
regulations.” Linkage regulations allow firms to list patents deemed relevant to an
already marketed product in order to extend market exclusivity. Generic firms must
successfully litigate each patent on the patent register prior to gaining market entry.
Patenting and litigation under linkage regulations are critical to brand-name and generic
markets, as they represent a primary mechanism by which regulators promote drug
development in exchange for intellectual property rights. The linkage regime in Canada
has now reached a stage of some maturity since coming into force in 1993, providing an
excellent opportunity to empirically investigate how patents and linkage regulations are
intertwined and are employed by multinational pharmaceutical firms in order to protect
high value innovations.
The present work was designed to empirically investigate two related phenomena
within the context of the emerging linkage regulation model of intellectual property
protection. The first was to probe the legal nexus between drug approval, drug patenting,
and patent listing under the linkage regime for high value pharmaceuticals as vetted by
regulators and the market. While the patent regime has been claimed by both
pharmaceutical firms and regulators to be integral for innovative drug development, the
*
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role of drug approval-drug patenting linkage in pharmaceutical innovation is far less
clear. Evidence relating to drug approval-drug patenting linkage, especially for high
value pharmaceuticals, would therefore be valuable at a time when other jurisdictions
might be contemplating similar provisions. The second was to address how certain
characteristics of the existing drug approval framework, such as relatively low thresholds
for drugs to accrue a new active substance designation (equivalent to a new chemical
entity), to be approved as a follow-on drug as opposed to a new drug, and to go through
an expedited rather than conventional approval process, might be linked to patenting and
patent listing patterns. Given the requirement under linkage law for intellectual property
protection to be linked to a specific drug submission, we were particularly interested in
exploring data relating to what we refer to as a “paradoxical drug approval-drug patenting
linkage.” That is, a legal linkage whereby the largest scope of intellectual property
protection accrues to drugs with the least innovative character.
The remaining analysis is split into five parts. In Part II we provide background
information relating to conventional patent law and emerging linkage regulations. In Part
III we provide an overview of the methodology employed in our empirical study. In Part
IV we describe the data relating to patenting and patent listing under the NOC
Regulations. A number of different groups were analyzed: the entire cohort of drugs,
most profitable drugs by sales, drugs approved via an expedited approval process without
significant post-market conditions, drug approved via expedited approval with significant
post-market conditions, and drugs approved via a combination of the latter two pathways.
Approved drugs and patents were also analyzed in relation to their patent type
classification (chemical, process, combination, use, etc.) and World Health Organization
therapeutic class designation (cardiovascular, antibiotic, antineoplastic, etc.). In Part V
we interpret the data and provide a brief synthesis of the results in relation to existing
intellectual property and food and drug policy. Part VI is a summary and conclusions
section.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Patents

¶4

A patent for invention is a property right granted by the government to an inventor.
In most developed nations, property rights associated with a patent include the right to
exclude others from making, using or selling an invention. In Canada, this right takes
effect from the date the patent is granted for a period of 20 years after the filing date. 1 In
exchange for the grant of patent, inventors must provide a full description of the
invention and how it is enabled so that the public can benefit from disclosure and use it to
develop further innovations in that or related fields. This quid pro quo between the
inventor and public is referred to as the traditional patent bargain, 2 and was
institutionalized for the first time in the English Statute of Monopolies 1623. 3
1

Patent Act, R.S.C, ch. P 4, §§ 42, 44 (1985).
See Free World Trust v. Électro Santé Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024, 2000 SCC 66, ¶ 13 (Can.);
Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067, 2000 SCC 67, ¶ 37 (Can.); Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,
52 U.S. 248 (1850); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-9 (1965).
3
Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 23 (Eng.). The Supreme Court has noted that even prior to
the Statute of Monopolies “the Crown rewarded an inventor with a limited monopoly in exchange for
public disclosure of “a new invention and a new trade within the kingdom … or if a man hath made a new
2
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The requirements for patenting and the relation thereof to drug approval in Canada
generally track those in other developed nations, particularly the United States (U.S.). 4
Section 2 of the Canadian Patent Act defines an invention as any “new and useful art,
process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement in any art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter.” 5 An
invention must meet three basic requirements in order to be patentable; the subject
matter 6 defined in the claims must be new, useful and non-obvious. 7 The first
requirement is met where the subject matter of the patent has not yet been disclosed to the
public. The second is met where the subject matter provides sufficient utility or benefit
to the public and achieves the purpose for which it came into being. The third is met
where the subject matter constitutes an “inventive step” or manifests sufficient “inventive
ingenuity” over the prior art to warrant the traditional patent bargain. Where an inventive
step is lacking, a patent is not granted or, if granted, can be later ruled invalid on the
grounds that it is “obvious” in light of the prior art, provided that the person skilled in the
art would have been led directly and without difficulty to the solution taught by the
patent. 8 When the claims at issue are deemed to be obvious or anticipated (for lack of
novelty), they are struck down and can no longer be used to prohibit competitors from
using the invention.
B. Linkage Regulations

¶6

Patents are consistently claimed to be invaluable to drug development in the
pharmaceutical industry, 9 in part to compensate firms for long regulatory lag periods and
the high costs of innovation. An element of pharmaceutical patent law unique to the U.S.
and Canada is a relatively novel form of legal ordering referred to as “linkage
regulations.” So named because they tie patent protection for marketed pharmaceuticals
to the drug approval process, linkage regulations enable brand-name pharmaceutical
firms to list as many patents as are deemed “relevant” to a marketed product on a patent
register. 10 Blockbuster drugs coming off patent protection can in this manner have a
discovery of any thing.” Free World Trust, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1024, 2000 SCC 66, ¶ 13.
4
The requirements for patenting in the United States are set out in the U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–
376 (2006).
5
Patent Act, R.S.C, ch. P 4, § 2.
6
Section 27(4) of the Canadian Patent Act stipulates that the subject matter of the patent must be
defined distinctly and explicitly in the claims section of the patent.
7
Patent Act, R.S.C, ch. P 4, § 28.2(1) (subject matter defined in the claims must not have been
disclosed more than one year before the filing date); id. § 28.3 (subject-matter must not “have been obvious
on the claim date to a person skilled in the art or science to which it pertains”). See also Henriksen v.
Tallon Ltd., [1965] R.P.C. 434 (Can.); Burton Parsons v. Hewlett Packard (Canada) Ltd. [1976] S.C.R. 555
(Can.).
8
See Beecham Canada Ltd. v. Procter & Gamble Co., [1982] 61 C.P.R. (2d) 7 (Can.).
9
See generally MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY, chs. 8, 9
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2008) (“Does Intellectual Property Increase Innovation?” and “The Pharmaceutical
Industry”); Stuart Macdonald, When Means Become Ends: Considering the Impact of Patent Strategy on
Innovation, 16 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 135 (2004), available at
http://www.stuartmacdonald.org.uk/pdfs/Macdonald.pdf.
10
See generally Edward Hore, A Comparison of US and Canadian Laws as They Affect Generic
Pharmaceutical Drug Entry, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 373 (1992); Ron A. Bouchard, Should Scientific
Research in the Lead-up to Invention Vitiate Obviousness Under the Patented Medicines (Notice of
Compliance) Regulations: To Test Or Not To Test? 6 CAN. J. L. & TECH. 1 (2007); Ron A. Bouchard,
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period of market exclusivity that is significantly extended beyond that for the originating
patent (e.g., on the new active substance or new chemical entity). In Canada this occurs
under the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations (NOC Regulations). 11
The Canadian linkage regulations were modeled after the U.S. Hatch-Waxman
linkage regime, 12 under which patent protection under the Patent Act 13 is legally tied to
drug approval under the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act 14 via patent listings in the Orange
Book. 15 The NOC Regulations came into force in 1993, at which time they replaced
provisions in the Patent Act directed to compulsory licensing. Prior to 1993, patent
protection and regulatory approval of pharmaceuticals were governed by different
statutes as well as different policy goals and objectives. 16 Thus, compared to the 400 year
old patent system, the linkage regime represents a novel and emerging intellectual
property paradigm for protecting pharmaceutical inventions.
The enabling section in the Patent Act for the NOC Regulations is contained in
the section on infringement. 17 This, however, should not be taken to indicate that actions
Living Separate and Apart is Never Easy: Inventive Capacity of the PHOSITA As the Tie That Binds
Obviousness and Inventiveness, 4 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 1 (2007).
11
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations SOR/1993-133 (Can).
12
Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C § 355 (2006).
13
35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006).
14
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–97 (2006).
15
Drugs approved by the FDA are listed in its “Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence”
publication, commonly known as the “Orange Book.” 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(7)(A) (2006). For a description
of the Orange Book in the context of patent litigation and drug development, see Andrew A. Caffrey &
Jonathan M. Rotter, Consumer Protection, Patents and Procedure: Generic Drug Market Entry and the
Need to Reform the Hatch-Waxman Act, 9 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4-7 (2004) and Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Patents, Product Exclusivity, and Information Dissemination: How Law Directs Biopharmaceutical
Research and Development, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 477 (2003).
16
See AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Health), [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560, 2006 SCC 49
(Can.). In AstraZeneca Canada, the court noted that
The NOC Regulations lie at the intersection of two regulatory systems with sometimes
conflicting objectives. First, is the law governing approval of new drugs, which seeks to
ensure the safety and efficacy of new medications before they can be put on the market.
The governing rules are set out in the Food and Drugs Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-27 (“FDA”)
and the Food and Drug Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, c. 870. The FDA process culminates
(if successful) in the issuance of a NOC to an applicant manufacturer by the Minister of
Health on the advice of his officials in the Therapeutic Products Directorate. The FDA
objective is to encourage bringing safe and effective medicines to market to advance the
nation’s health. The achievement of this objective is tempered by a second and to some
extent overlapping regulatory system created by the Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4.
Under that system, in exchange for disclosure to the public of an invention, including the
invention of a medication, the innovator is given the exclusive right to its exploitation for
a period of 20 years. Until 1993, the two regulatory systems were largely kept distinct
and separate.
Id. at ¶ 12 (some emphasis added).
17
The relevant provisions state that:
It is not an infringement of a patent for any person to make, construct, use or sell the
patented invention solely for uses reasonably related to the development and submission
of information required under any law of Canada, a province or a country other than
Canada that regulates the manufacture, construction, use or sale of any product.
Patent Act, R.S.C, ch. P 4, § 55.2(1) (1985), and:
The Governor in Council may make such regulations as the Governor in Council
considers necessary for preventing the infringement of a patent by any person who
makes, constructs, uses or sells a patented invention in accordance with subsection (1),
including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, regulations : (a) respecting the
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under the NOC Regulations are parallel to a conventional infringement proceeding. Drug
patenting, including the legal analysis of validity and infringement, is inexorably tied to
the output of the drug approval exercise. To market a drug product in Canada, drug
manufacturers (brand or generic) must first obtain regulatory approval for the relevant
medicinal product. The form of this approval in Canada is referred to as a Notice of
Compliance (NOC), which is received from the Minister of Health pursuant to
regulations promulgated under the Food and Drugs Act. 18 The Minister is obliged to
issue a NOC to a drug manufacturer where the drug has met all of the required regulatory
standards pertaining to the safety and efficacy of the drug in question. Brand-name drug
companies submit a New Drug Submission (NDS) containing “test data,” including
clinical trial and experimental data, relevant to the demonstration of health and safety.
Generic firms on the other hand submit an Abbreviated New Drug Submission (“ANDS”)
based not on original test data but rather on bioequivalence 19 to the relevant Canadian
reference product. 20
Under the NOC Regulations, a “first person,” typically a brand-name sponsor, may
list patents on the patent register in connection with drug products for which they hold
regulatory approval. 21 If a “second person,” typically a generic sponsor, files a
submission that makes a comparison or reference to the first person’s drug based on
bioequivalence, the Minister may not issue a NOC for the generic drug until the second
person has addressed all listed patents. As noted above, where a generic firm files a
submission that makes a comparison or reference to the first person’s drug, regulators
may not issue a NOC to the generic until the second person has addressed all relevant
listed patents. This means the second person must accept that it will either not obtain
regulatory approval relevant to its ANDS until expiry of all listed patents 22 or to avoid
this situation it must serve an “allegation” on the first person (Notice of Allegation) that
conditions that must be fulfilled before a notice, certificate, permit or other document
concerning any product to which a patent may relate may be issued to a patentee or other
person under any Act of Parliament that regulates the manufacture, construction, use or
sale of that product, in addition to any conditions provided for by or under that Act . . . .
Patent Act, R.S.C, ch. P 4, § 55.2(4).
18
Food and Drug Regulations, C.R.C., ch. 870 (1978).
19
The term “bioequivalence” refers to the scientific basis on which generic and brand-name drugs are
compared. To be considered bioequivalent, the bioavailability of two products must not differ significantly
when the two products are given in studies at the same dosage under similar conditions. A product may still
however be considered bioequivalent to a second product with different pharmacological or pharmaceutical
characteristics if the difference is noted in the labelling and doesn't affect the drug's safety or effectiveness
or change the drug's effects in any medically significant way. In its Guidance Document, the FDA defines
bioequivalence as:
[T]he rate and extent to which the active ingredient or active moiety is absorbed from a
drug product and becomes available at the site of action. For drug products that are not
intended to be absorbed into the bloodstream, bioavailability may be assessed by
measurements intended to reflect the rate and extent to which the active ingredient or
active moiety becomes available at the site of action.
FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY:
BIOAVAILABILITY AND BIOEQUIVALENCE STUDIES FOR ORALLY ADMINISTERED DRUG PRODUCTS —
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS (2003), available at
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ucm070124.
pdf.
20
Food and Drug Regulations, C.R.C., § C.08.002.1.
21
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations SOR/1993-133, §§ 3, 4 (Can).
22
Id. at § 5(1)(a).
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the listed patent or patents are invalid or will not be infringed by its submission, 23
together with a detailed statement of the legal and factual basis of the allegation. 24 When
served with a Notice of Allegation a brand-name sponsor may within 45 days commence
a judicial review application for an order that the NOC not be issued to the generic
sponsor. 25
¶10
Where the brand-name sponsor does commence such an application, a NOC will
not be issued until the earliest of 24 months, until determination of the issues in court, or
patent expiry. 26 In other words, by merely commencing the proceeding, the applicant
receives an automatic injunction (also referred to an “automatic stay”) under
circumstances where the merits of the case are not determined by the court and indeed
without having to satisfy the criteria courts would normally require before enjoining
issuance of an NOC. 27 At the hearing of a judicial review application under the NOC
Regulations the court must determine whether the generic manufacturer’s allegation is
legally “justified.” If the court finds the allegation is not so justified, the court must issue
an “order of prohibition” preventing the Minister from issuing the NOC until patent
expiry. 28 If, on the other hand, the court finds the allegation is justified, the application
is dismissed,29 and a NOC may be granted to the generic sponsor provided that regulatory
review is complete and no other litigation is outstanding.
¶11
Unlike parallel litigation under the U.S. Hatch-Waxman linkage regime, an action
under the NOC Regulations is by way of judicial review. Therefore, it does not
constitute an action for infringement. 30 A formal decision on patent infringement or
validity cannot be determined in NOC proceedings, notwithstanding the fact that judicial
pronouncements on validity or infringement amount to the same thing and utilize
infringement case law as precedent. 31 The Federal Court of Appeal has held that the
object of litigation under the NOC Regulations is solely to decide issuance of a NOC
under the Food and Drug Regulations. 32 If a party seeks a formal decision on patent
infringement or invalidity, they must avail themselves of remedies under the Patent Act. 33
Indeed, recent cases have arisen where pharmaceutical patents have been deemed either
invalid or not infringed under NOC Regulations and valid or infringed in a later
infringement proceeding. 34
23

Id. at § 5(1)(b).
Id. at § 5(3)(a).
25
Id. at § 6(1).
26
Id. at § 7. If litigation was commenced prior to March 12, 1998 however, the automatic stay was 30
months as under U.S. Hatch-Waxman legislation.
27
See Bayer A.G. v. Canada, [1993], 51 C.P.R. (3d) 329, 337 (Can.); Merck Frosst Canada Inc. v.
Apotex, [1998] 80 C.P.R. (3d) 368, ¶ 33 (Can.).
28
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations SOR/1993-133, at § 6(1).
29
See Pharmacia Inc. v. Canada, [1994] 58 C.P.R. (3d) 209, 217 (Can.); Pfizer Canada Inc. v. Nu-Pharm
Inc., [1998] 83 C.P.R. (3d) 1, 4 (Can.); Apotex Inc. v. Canada, [1997] 76 C.P.R. (3d) 1, 11-12 (Can.).
30
See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Apotex Inc., [1997] 76 C.P.R. (3d) 1, 5–6 (Can.).
31
Ron A. Bouchard, Should Scientific Research in the Lead-up to Invention Vitiate Obviousness Under
the Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations: To Test or Not to Test?, 6 CAN. J. L. TECH. 1
(2007); Ron A. Bouchard, Living Separate and Apart is Never Easy: Inventive Capacity of the PHOSITA as
the Tie that Binds Obviousness and Inventiveness in Pharmaceutical Litigation, 4 Ottawa L. & Tech. J. (In
Press), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=958927 (2007).
32
Merck Frosst Canada Inc. v. Canada [1994] 55 C.P.R. (3d) 302, 319 (Can.).
33
See Pharmacia Inc., 58 C.P.R. (3d), at 217; Merck Frosst Canada Inc., 55 C.P.R. (3d) at 320.
34
Bouchard, supra note 10, at 7-18.
24
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Judicial review under the NOC Regulations is considered to be an expedited
proceeding, and thus summary in nature. Therefore, it does not entail full exploration of
evidentiary matters that would otherwise be before the court in an infringement
proceeding, 35 particularly viva voce evidence that is otherwise central to a patent
infringement proceeding. Rather, litigation consists of an out of court exchange of
affidavit evidence and cross-examination, followed by a 1-2 day hearing. Typically,
numerous motions precede the actual hearing, including multiple variations on those to
receive or exclude evidence. Even though judicial review proceedings under the NOC
Regulations are deemed to be summary in nature, in practice it can often take up to two
years to get to a hearing, which is roughly equivalent to the time required to obtain
regulatory approval.
¶13
Under the provisions of the Canadian linkage regime, each patent listed on the
patent register must be demonstrated in litigation to be invalid or not infringed for generic
market entry. The patent register is thus said to be “the linchpin of the NOC
Regulations” regime. 36 The threshold for listing is relevance to an existing drug product.
Early Federal Court of Appeal jurisprudence in Eli Lilly v. Canada 37 rejected the notion
of a strict relevance requirement, opting instead for a narrow statutory reading to the
effect that patents need only be relevant to a medicine rather than the drug form
specifically approved by regulators. In other words, patents could be listed generally for
a drug rather than against a specific drug submission. In 2006, the government issued a
Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement (RIAS) accompanying amendments to the NOC
Regulations explaining that listed patents were required to contain at least one specific
claim to the medical ingredient, formulation, dosage form or use for which approval was
granted. 38 This was followed by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in
AstraZeneca v. Canada, 39 which supported a specific relevance requirement and cast
doubt on the reasoning employed by lower courts in defending a general listing
requirement. The Federal Court of Appeal, citing AstraZeneca, reversed its earlier ruling
that a patent containing a claim for the medicine in a drug is listed generally against the
drug, rather than against the specific submission for a notice of compliance upon which

35

Merck Frosst Canada Inc., 55 C.P.R (3d) at 320.
Wyeth Canada v. Ratiopharm Inc., [2007] 60 C.P.R. (4th) 375, ¶ 22 (Can.). In Wyeth Canada, the
court elaborated:
Pursuant to subsection 4(1) of the NOC Regulations, the right to have a patent listed on
the patent register in respect of a certain drug may be exercised only by a drug
manufacturer that has filed a NDS for that drug. That provision is enforced through
subsection 4(5), which provides that a patent list must identify the NDS to which it
relates and the date on which the NDS was filed. In addition, subsection 3(3) of the NOC
Regulations provides that a patent cannot be listed until the NDS that is the basis for the
listing application is approved by the Minister and a NOC is issued for the drug in
response to that NDS. Thus, every patent listing is permanently tied to a specific NOC
filed by the innovator and its originating NDS, as well as to the drug in respect of which
the patent is listed. For that reason, a particular patent listing may be identified as a listing
‘against’ a certain NOC.
37
Eli Lilly Canada v. Canada, [2003] 3 F.C. 140 (Can.).
38
The Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement accompanying SOR/2006-242 contains an in depth
discussion of that policy, as well as the role played by the PM(NOC) Regulations. The history of the
relevance requirement is reviewed in a later Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement relating to the Patented
Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations PM(NOC) Regulations) issued April 3, 2009.
39
AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560, 2006 SCC 49 (Can.).
36
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the patent list is based. 40 The government issued a revised guidance document in 2009
attempting to harmonize previous jurisprudence and policy grounds supporting a specific
listing requirement. 41
¶14
The intensity of the volleying back and forth between litigants, legislators, and the
courts over the issue of relevance suggests that framing a system of pharmaceutical
innovation around the nexus between drugs that have already been approved and
continuing patenting activity on these older products represents a contentious model of
innovative drug development. As noted by the Federal Court of Appeal in Wyeth v.
Ratiopharm, a generic sponsor initially may be “required to address every patent listed in
respect of the Canadian reference product to which the proposed generic version is
compared, whether or not the patent is properly listed.” 42 While the U.S. and Canada are
currently the only two jurisdictions formally employing linkage regulations to stimulate
innovation, there is movement afoot to institute linkage regulation regimes in other
jurisdictions at the same time as the U.S. moves towards including provisions of this
nature more broadly in its international trade agreements. 43 As with the patent bargain,
the stated purpose of the linkage regulations regime is to provide monopoly rights to
private firms in exchange for new and innovative drugs while at the same time facilitating
the timely entry of generic drugs. 44
¶15
The combination of the automatic injunction, the low relevance requirement for
listing patents on the patent register, the potentially endless number of patents listed for
attractive drug candidates, and the summary nature of the proceedings compared to
conventional infringement actions is viewed by many to present an effective and efficient
mechanism for brand-name sponsors to “evergreen” blockbuster products coming off
patent. 45 The ability of the linkage regulations regime to provide a broad scope of
40

Wyeth Canada, 60 C.P.R. (4th) 375 at 29.
Guidance Document: Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, http://www.hcsc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/prodpharma/applic-demande/guide-ld/patmedbrev/pmreg3_mbreg3-eng.php (Apr. 3,
2008).
42
Wyeth Canada, 60 C.P.R. (4th) 375 at 34.
43
Judit Rius Sanjuan, Patent-Registration Linkage (Apr. 3, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Consumer Project on Technology), available at
http://www.cptech.org/publications/CPTechDPNo2Linkage.pdf.
44
The “original policy intent” of Parliament in enacting the NOC Regulations—to balance patent
enforcement over new and innovative drugs with the timely market entry of generic drugs—is set out in
numerous government Regulatory Impact Analysis Statements (RIASs), which the Supreme Court of
Canada ruled are proper evidence of legislative intent. See Biolyse Pharma Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co., [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533, 2005 SCC 26, ¶¶ 47, 156-157 (Can.). Evidence of legislative intent regarding
balancing patent enforcement and generic entry can be found in early RIAS documents. For example, see:
C. Gaz. Vol. 132, No. 7 – March 12, 1998; C. Gaz. Vol. 133, No. 21 – October 1, 1999. Evidence of
legislative intent regarding both balancing patent enforcement and generic entry in the context of the
“original policy intent” of encouraging development of new and innovative drugs can be found in later
RIAS and Guidance Documents. For example, see: C. Gaz. Vol. 138, no. 50 – December 11, 2004; C. Gaz.
Vol. 140, No. 24 - June 17, 2006; C. Gaz. Vol. 142, No. 13 – June 25, 2008. An example of the latter
language is found in the June 17, 2006 RIAS (at 1510), which states: “The Government's pharmaceutical
patent policy seeks to balance effective patent enforcement over new and innovative drugs with the timely
market entry of their lower priced generic competitors. The current manner in which that balance is realized
was established in 1993, with the enactment of Bill C-91, the Patent Act Amendment Act, 1992, S.C. 1993,
c. 2.” (emphasis added). For commentary relating to U.S. linkage regulations, see Caffrey & Rotter, supra
note 15.
45
“Evergreening” refers to undue extension of the statutory monopoly attached to drug product by
means of listing on the patent register multiple patents with obvious or uninventive modifications. Under
41
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intellectual property protection to follow-on drugs in particular is enhanced in light of the
wide definition of a new active substance (NAS), the wide range of chemical
modifications to existing drugs allowed under the follow-on, or supplemental new drug
submission (SNDS), the approval pathway, and the wide berth given for drugs to undergo
expedited review.
¶16
Given the legal requirement that patent protection under the NOC Regulations is
specific to a particular submission, the wide berth for approval of new (NAS) and followon (SNDS) drugs raises the possibility of a paradoxical drug approval-drug patenting
linkage. For example, in both policy documents and case law, it is invariably assumed
that there is a positive, if not linear, correlation between the scope of intellectual property
protection afforded by the linkage regime and the degree of innovation associated with a
particular drug product. A positive (and linear) correlation would be consistent with the
intent of the federal government to balance patent enforcement over new and innovative
drugs with the timely market entry of generic drugs. However, the fact that
pharmaceutical companies are focusing more on evergreening older products and on
incremental drug development rather than breakthrough drug development suggests that
firms may be leveraging legal loopholes favouring enhanced patent protection for drugs
with low innovative value. This may undermine the intent of government to use the
“special enforcement provisions” of the linkage regime to protect only those patents
associated with new and innovative drugs. To the extent patent protection is extended for
already marketed drugs, it might also contravene the second pillar of the government’s
policy to facilitate the timely market entry of lower priced generic products.
¶17
Given the discussion thus far, it is not surprising that concerns have been voiced
with increasing frequency over the willingness of the public to underwrite the high cost
of drugs that are extensions of already marketed products and that offer little or no
improvement in therapeutic value. 46 Therapeutic product development therefore
represents an excellent target for empirical studies of the relationship between legal
incentives for innovation and resulting product development. As pointed out repeatedly

such circumstances, the patentee prolongs its monopoly beyond what the public has agreed to pay. See
Whirlpool Corp. v. Camco Inc., [2000] 2 S.C.R. 1067, 2000 SCC 67, ¶ 37 (Can.); Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533, 2005 SCC 26, ¶ 66; AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v.
Canada, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560, 2006 SCC 49, ¶ 39. According to the highly regarded “Romanow Report”:
A particular concern with current pharmaceutical industry practice is the process of
“evergreening,” where manufacturers of brand name drugs make variations to existing
drugs in order to extend their patent coverage. This delays the ability of generic
manufacturers to develop cheaper products for the marketplace and it is a questionable
outcome of Canada’s patent law.
COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF HEALTH CARE IN CANADA, BUILDING ON VALUES: THE FUTURE OF HEALTH
CARE IN CANADA 208 (2002), available at http://www.cbc.ca/healthcare/final_report.pdf. In the U.S.,
undue use of linkage regulations to prolong the patent monopoly has been referred to as “abuse of the
automatic stay provision.” See Caffrey & Rotter, supra note 15, at 13.
46
See generally JAMES LOVE, CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECH., EVIDENCE REGARDING RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENTS IN INNOVATIVE AND NON-INNOVATIVE MEDICINES (2003), available at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/rnd/evidenceregardingrnd.pdf; Joel Lexchin, Intellectual Property Rights
and the Canadian Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Where Do We Go From Here?, 35 INT’L. J. HEALTH
SERV. 237, 243 (2005); Drugs in 2001: A Number of Ruses Unveiled, 11 PRESCRIBE INT’L 58 (2002); see
also Ron A. Bouchard & Trudo Lemmens, Privatizing Biomedical Research—A ‘Third Way’, 26 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 31 (2008). But see Joshua Cohen & Kenneth Kaitin, Follow-On Drugs and Indications:
The Importance of Incremental Innovation to Medical Practice, 15 AM. J. THERAPEUTICS 89 (2008).
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over the last decade, 47 robust conclusions regarding the consequences for technological
innovation of changes in patent policy are few and far between, in large part owing to a
lack of empirical data. The same applies in the reverse, as governments have specific
legal and policy goals in mind when drafting law and regulations that are reviewable by
the courts in judicial review proceedings. The present study was designed specifically to
investigate whether and how the NOC Regulations have encouraged the development of
new and innovative drugs since being enacted.
¶18
Our goal in the current study is to empirically probe the legal and functional link
between drug approval, drug patenting, and drug litigation for high value pharmaceutical
innovations. As already noted, patenting and litigation under linkage regulations are
critical to both brand-name and generic markets, as they represent the primary
mechanism by which regulators promote drug development in exchange for intellectual
property rights. We were also interested in gathering data pertaining to the manner in
which certain characteristics of drug approval-drug patenting linkage, such as how the
threshold requirements for an NAS, SNDS approval and expedited review, might direct
firm patenting and linkage regulations activities.
III. METHODS
A. General
¶19

The term “drug approval-drug patent linkage” is used throughout this Article to
refer to the specific legal nexus between drug approval under food and drug law and drug
47
See, e.g., Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation and the Innovation
Process, 29 RESEARCH POL’Y 531 (2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=198989. Jaffe notes that it
is possible that the R&D boom in the late 1970s and early 1980s would not have been so large or lasted so
long without enhanced IP rights, that it is “disquieting, however, that there is so little empirical evidence
that what is widely perceived to be a significant strengthening of intellectual property protection had
significant impact on the innovation process.” Id. at 540. He also notes that “[o]verall, there is a noticeable
gap between the highly developed theoretical literature on patent scope and the limited empirical
literature.” Id. at 548. He posits that “[t]his limited success is due partially to the difficulty of measuring
the parameters of patent policy, and partly due to the difficulty of discerning statistically significant effects
when many things have been changing at the same time. But it should surely be viewed as a challenge to
researchers to try to do more.” Id. at 554. Other authors suggest that
the range of arguments about the positive social value of patents is obviously much wider
than the area of strong empirical studies explored to date. An analyst, citing earlier
studies that appear to have shown limited social value, obviously is vulnerable to the
argument that those studies do not provide evidence on some of the possibly most
important functions patents serve. . . . .
We cannot present here an empirically supported and intellectually persuasive
argument on this broad question. The important empirical research that needs to be done
in order to map out the basic facts simply has not been done yet . . . .
Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of Strong Patent Protection: a
Contribution to the Current Debate, 27 RESEARCH POL’Y 273, 280 (1998). In a meta-analysis of empirical
studies of whether introducing or strengthening patent protection leads to greater innovation, Boldrin and
Levine “identified twenty three economic studies that have examined this issue empirically. . . . The
executive summary: these studies find weak or no evidence that strengthening patent regimes increases
innovation; they find evidence that strengthening the patent regime increases . . . patenting!” BOLDRIN &
LEVINE, supra note 9, at 192. See also Keith Pavitt, National Policies for Technical Change: Where Are the
Increasing Returns to Economic Research?, 93 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12693 (1996); JAMES
BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT
INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008).
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patenting under patent legislation via the linkage regulations regime, in this case the
Patented Medicine (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, or NOC Regulations. Drugs
were analysed in this study in two ways. First, the characteristics of the entire cohort of
95 drugs (Cohort) were evaluated. Patenting per calendar year, patenting expressed as
year after the first instance on the drug, patent listing per year, cumulative patenting and
patent listing, and the temporal lag between the average date of drug approval, the
average date of patent issue and the average date of patent listing were also explored.
Finally, patent type classifications and therapeutic class for drugs and patents for the
Cohort were investigated. Secondly, drugs were sub-divided into 4 further groups: Most
Profitable drugs (n=33), Priority Review (n=40), drugs receiving an NOC with conditions
(NOC/c; n=16) and drugs receiving NOC/c approvals that were also approved via Priority
Review (PR-NOC/c; n=6). All drugs had at least one approval in between 2001 and
2008, as described in Sawicka & Bouchard. 48 Drugs were thus split into categories
representing products already vetted by the market to be blockbuster in nature and those
that were granted expedited review status by regulators in the hopes they would be.
¶20
As indicated by the designations just described, expedited approvals were divided
into three categories. The reason for this approach is that NOCs can be granted in an
expedited fashion under Canadian food and drug law in two primary ways which can be
combined to create a third category. 49 The first is through Priority Review, 50 which refers
to the fast-tracking of eligible drug candidates intended for the treatment, prevention, or
diagnosis of serious, life-threatening or severely debilitating diseases or conditions
wherein there exists an unmet medical need or for which a substantial improvement in the
benefit-risk profile is demonstrated. 51 Evidentiary requirements for safety, efficacy, and
quality parallel those for non-priority submissions; the main difference being an
accelerated review time. 52 The second is the “NOC with conditions” (NOC/c) pathway. 53
NOC/c approval is granted for eligible NDS or SNDS submissions directed to serious,
life-threatening or severely debilitating diseases or conditions for which there is
promising evidence of clinical effectiveness based on available data. 54 In addition to less
onerous evidentiary requirements, the review process for NOC/c approval is significantly
accelerated. 55 The main difference with Priority Review is that NOC/c licensure is
48

Monika Sawicka & Ron A. Bouchard, Empirical Analysis of Canadian Drug Approval Data 20012008: Are Pharmaceutical Players “Doing More With Less?”, 3 MCGILL J.L. & HEALTH. 87 (2009).
49
For a detailed discussion of expedited review pathways in Canada, see Ron A. Bouchard & Monika
Sawicka, The Mud and the Blood and the Beer: Canada’s Progressive Licensing Framework for Drug
Approval, 3 MCGILL J.L. & HEALTH 51, 56-60 (2009).
50
HEALTH CANADA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: PRIORITY REVIEW OF DRUG SUBMISSIONS (2006),
available at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/hpfb-dgpsa/pdf/prodpharma/priordr-eng.pdf.
51
Id. at 1-2.
52
See Trudo Lemmens & Ron A. Bouchard, Regulation of Pharmaceuticals in Canada, in CANADIAN
HEALTH LAW AND POLICY 326, 328 (Jocelyn Downie, Timothy Caulfield & Colleen Flood, eds., Toronto:
LexisNexis, 3d ed. 2007).
53
NOC/c approvals are granted pursuant to § C.08.004(1), in compliance with the conditions of use
stipulated in § C.08.002(1)(g), C.08.002(1)(h), C.08.006(2)(b), and C.05.006(2)(a) of the Food and Drug
Regulations, supra note 18.
54
HEALTH CANADA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE WITH CONDITIONS (2007),
available at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/hpfb-dgpsa/pdf/prodpharma/noccg_accd-eng.pdf.
55
HEALTH CANADA, ACCESS TO THERAPEUTIC PRODUCTS: THE REGULATORY PROCESS IN CANADA –
TARGET REVIEW TIMES (2006), available at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/ahc-asc/pubs/hpfb-dgpsa/accesstherapeutic_acces-therapeutique-eng.php#6.2.
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granted on the condition that the sponsor perform additional studies to confirm alleged
benefits. The third category, PR-NOC/c approvals, are drugs that represent the highest
potential value for pharmaceutical firms. This is because of the combination of expedited
review with lower pre-approval evidentiary requirements that would be seen by
regulators to be aimed at target populations with the highest degree of unmet medical
needs and/or benefit/risk.
¶21
The Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) website provides public access
to its comprehensive electronic database housing all patents issued or pending issuance in
Canada. The database contains patent documents from 1869 to the present. The
electronically available patent information consists of patent document images which
include the patent cover page, abstract, claims, description, drawings and bibliographic
and text data which provide a patent summary, patent details and the patent claims
excised of all drawings. 56 The online portal allows for searches to be performed against
the bibliographic and text data fields only. Images are not searchable but can be viewed
for any particular patent that has been returned in a given search.
¶22
Presently, the database permits searching for patent documents by number, by
words in the invention, inventor country, owner, owner country, title, abstract, and
claims’ fields or by International Patent Classification (IPC), Canadian Patent
Classification (CPC), Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) applications, availability of
license, and language of filing. These searches can be combined or modified by Boolean
operators and restricted to selected date ranges on any date field. The search results
screen lists all patents captured by a particular search string by their patent number and
truncated title. Details of patents can be viewed by clicking on the patent number.
¶23
Patents within the CIPO database are not classified according to claimed uses for
which the inventions have acquired patent protection or by the products and technologies
that apply or make use of the protected invention. This makes it difficult to link patented
inventions to the commercial products for which they provide exclusivity. In the case of
medicinal drugs, this shortcoming makes it difficult to link drug patents to the brandname drug products for which they provide brand-name pharmaceutical companies with
commercial exclusivity.
Canadian brand-name pharmaceutical companies can
voluntarily list patents relevant to drug products approved for use and sale in Canada by
registering these patents with the Canadian Patent Register (CPR) pursuant to NOC
Regulations. As noted supra, patent listing under the CPR is analogous to listing of
patents in the Orange Book under the U.S. Hatch-Waxman linkage regime. As
registering patents is voluntary and at the discretion of the individual pharmaceutical
companies, the patent list cannot be considered comprehensive or even representative of
all patents associated with a specific drug product. Specific searches of the CIPO and
other data bases were thus undertaken.

56

In particular, the Patent Summary includes the patent number, application number, English title,
French title, and abstract, and the Patent Details include the patent’s Canadian Patent Classification (CPC),
International Patent Classification, Inventors, Owners, Applicants, Agent, Date of Issue, Date of Filing, the
availability of a license, the language of filing, Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) status, and application
priority date.
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B. Drug Patenting
¶24

In order to identify the full breadth of patent protection associated with a specific
Canadian drug product, every patent within the CIPO database must be considered as a
possible candidate, which may then be pruned for lack of relevance. The first level of
pruning is achieved by employing carefully tailored searches to the online CIPO
Database. These searches can be formulated so as to return only those patents owned or
assigned to the drug’s manufacturer (including those owned by its parent
company/subsidiaries and partners) that make claims regarding the specific medicinal
ingredients associated with the drug or claims regarding the general therapeutic class(es)
to which the drug belongs. Each drug therefore has two search strings: (a) a general
search string that returned patents that were likely to be relevant to the general
therapeutic class associated with the drug in question; and (b) a specific search string that
returned patents likely to be relevant to the specific drug in question. Both are provided
in Table 1 below.
TABLE 1. SEARCH STRINGS FOR DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS.
SEARCH STRING

BOOLEAN OPERATORS

General Search String

((therapeutic class)<OR>(active site))<AND><NOT>(chemical
name)<AND><NOT> (code name)<AND><NOT> (brand
name)<AND><NOT>(chemical class)<AND><NOT> (chemical
formula)<AND>(owners<IN> OWNER)<AND>(PAPD>=1867-0701)<AND> (PAPD<=study start date)
((chemical name)<OR>(code name)<OR>(brand name)<OR>(chemical
class)<OR> (chemical formula))<AND>(owners<IN>
OWNER)<AND>(PAPD>=1867-07-01)<AND> (PAPD<=study start date)

Specific Search String

¶25

The general search string uses Boolean operators to return all patents owned by the
drug manufacturer or its affiliates, not previously found by the specific search string, that
mention the therapeutic class(es) to which the drug belongs or make specific reference to
the drug’s active site. The therapeutic class and active site of a drug are obtained by
reference to CIPO, the Canadian Patent Register (CPR), their American counterparts, the
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (USPTO) and Orange Book (OB) database, and
secondary sources such as company websites and internet searches. These sources were
used to acquire an exhaustive list of all possible chemical names, codes names, brand
names and chemical classes associated with a particular drug.
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Fig 1. Example of Patent Tree Analysis for Advair Diskus.® Patents were identified using the specific
and general search strings described in the Methods. In addition to quantifying patents per drug, the patent
tree method allows assessment of how specific drugs evolve into related drug forms or (in this case) drug
products representing combinations of known drugs. In addition, the patent tree analysis allows for
identification of relevant patent types based on the classification nomenclature described in the Methods.
Finally, the patent tree analysis provides data relating to drug development, but also on the type of patents
selected by pharmaceutical companies for listing on the patent register in order to prevent generic entry.

¶26

The specific search string uses Boolean operators to return all patents owned by the
drug manufacturer or its affiliates that mention either the drug’s chemical name(s), code
name(s), brand name(s), chemical class(es) or chemical formula(s) and have priority
dates between the date of Canada’s Confederation and the start date of the study.
Databases such as CIPO, CPR, USPTO, and OB databases as well as secondary sources
were used to acquire an exhaustive list of all possible chemical names, codes names,
brand names and chemical classes associated with a particular drug. In determining the
chemical formula, precedence was given to formulae expressed in patents found on CIPO
and USPTO databases. The owners referred to within the search string refer not only to
the drug’s manufacturer, but also to its possible parent compan(ies), subsidiar(ies) and
partner(s). This list of owners was cross-referenced using CIPO, CPR, USPTO and OB
databases as well as searches of case law and secondary sources where necessary.
¶27
Combined, the search strings return a broad list of potential patents owned or
assigned to the Canadian manufacturer or its subsidiaries and partners. The legitimacy of
the search terms was confirmed using Health Canada’s drug approval data, as well as
manufacturer and securities and exchange websites, from which ownership histories were
ascertained. Patents were individually inspected and pruned for lack of relevance to
drugs in the study. The USPTO database, which provides a history of prior art, was also
used as a means of cross-referencing patents for relevance. Relevant patents were sorted
by priority date and cross-referenced with the patents registered on the CPR pursuant to
187
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linkage regulations. Each patent identified in this manner is recorded within a
comprehensive database that classifies each patent by drug product, International Patent
Code, owner(s), filling date, issue date, priority date, patent type and presence on the
Canadian Patent Register. All of this information is easily obtained for each patent on
CIPO except for the patent type and the patent’s presence on the CPR. In all, the two
search strings returned over 20,000 patents for analysis. Patents were reviewed and
pruned for relevance according to the methodology described. The resulting database
contained 3,850 patents deemed relevant to the Cohort of 95 drugs. Patent trees where
constructed whereby the number, type and timing of patents granted in relation to a
specific drug or follow-on drugs could be assessed and visualized. An example of such an
analysis is provided in Fig. 1.
C. Patent Listing
¶28

Patents may be listed on the Canadian Patent register (CPR) provided that they are
legally relevant to the already marketed Canadian Drug Product against which they are
listed. A patent’s presence on the CPR thus signals that the listing pharmaceutical
company acknowledges the patent to be an effective mechanism to enforcing its
commercial exclusivity on the drug product to which the patent has been linked.
Registered patents are typically the subject of much litigation and constitute valuable data
regarding how many patents granted for a specific drug product are listed on the CPR and
thus deemed valuable by pharmaceutical companies in regards to protecting blockbuster
drugs coming off patent. 57 The CPR website provides access to all patents currently
registered to brand-name firms in relation to Canadian Drug Products and also provides
the data for all patents removed from the register due to expiration or invalidity since
2002. Upon request, the CPR was able to provide additional information regarding
patents that were removed from the database prior to 2002 for the purposes of this study.
The comprehensive database obtained provides an exhaustive list of all patents that
effectively contribute to the commercial exclusivity of Canadian Drug Products
investigated in this study. We quantified patents identified that were listed on the
Canadian Patent Register under the NOC Regulations. Patents listed on the register can
be litigated numerous times owing to the fact that they can be listed for multiple Drug
Identification Numbers (DINs) under the NOC Regulations. For our purposes, only the
date of first instance (the earliest date on which the patent was registered) for each patent
was collected and analyzed.
D. Patent Class

¶29

The growing divergence between breakthrough drugs and “me too” and Line
Extension drugs is becoming of increasing concern to policy-makers and payers in light
of the growing basket of intellectual property and regulatory rights attached to these
products regardless of whether they are new or follow-on in nature. The primary
regulatory mechanisms underpinning patent and linkage incentives for developing

57

For a discussion of evergreening in the context of U.S. and Canadian linkage regulations, see Caffrey
& Rotter, supra note 15 and Hore, supra note 10.
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follow-on drugs are: the broad range of substances falling within the definition of a New
Active Substance (NAS) and the range of substances and uses meeting the requirements
for a Supplemental New Drug Submission (SNDS) supporting line extension and other
follow-on drugs.
¶30
Previously referred to as a “New Chemical Entity” (NCE), 58 the definition of a
NAS encompasses a wide range of chemically active substances, including (a) a chemical
or biological substance not previously approved for sale as a drug, (b) an isomer,
derivative, or salt of a chemical substance that is already approved for sale as a drug but
differing in properties with regard to safety and efficacy, or (c) a biological substance
previously approved for sale as a drug, but differing in molecular structure, nature of the
source material or even manufacturing process. 59 The scope of regulatory approval based
on a NAS is therefore very broad, and forms the basis for a wide berth of new (NDS) and
supplementary (SNDS) drug submissions, including whether drugs are classified as First
in Class or “Me Too” drugs. 60 An SNDS in particular may be filed for changes to a drug
that is already marketed by a sponsor, 61 including minor changes to dosage, strength,
formulation, manufacture, labelling, route of administration, or indication. 62 Thus, small
changes in chemical properties, route of administration or use may result in approval
within NDS or SNDS approval streams. Importantly, patents may be listed on the patent
register in respect of both NDS and SNDS drugs. 63
58

Letter from E. Somers, Health Canada, on New Active Substances (June 4, 1991), available at
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/hpfb-dgpsa/pdf/prodpharma/nas_nsa_pol-eng.pdf [hereinafter
Health Canada, New Active Substances Letter]; Health Canada, NOC Database Terminology (Oct. 1,
2004), available at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/prodpharma/notices-avis/noc-acc/term_noc_acceng.php.
59
Health Canada “NAS”, supra note 58; see also Health Canada NOC Database Terminology, supra
note 58.
60
Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 49.
61
Food and Drug Regulations, C.R.C., § C.08.003.
62
Id. at § C.08.003(2). See also Lemmens & Bouchard, supra note 52, at 326.
63
According to §§ 4(2) and 4(3) of the NOC Regulations:
(2) A patent on a patent list in relation to a new drug submission is eligible to be added
to the register if the patent contains (a) a claim for the medicinal ingredient and the
medicinal ingredient has been approved through the issuance of a notice of compliance in
respect of the submission; (b) a claim for the formulation that contains the medicinal
ingredient and the formulation has been approved through the issuance of a notice of
compliance in respect of the submission; (c) a claim for the dosage form and the dosage
form has been approved through the issuance of a notice of compliance in respect of the
submission; or (d) a claim for the use of the medicinal ingredient, and the use has been
approved through the issuance of a notice of compliance in respect of the submission.
(3) A patent on a patent list in relation to a supplement to a new drug submission is
eligible to be added to the register if the supplement is for a change in formulation, a
change in dosage form or a change in use of the medicinal ingredient, and (a) in the case
of a change in formulation, the patent contains a claim for the changed formulation that
has been approved through the issuance of a notice of compliance in respect of the
supplement; (b) in the case of a change in dosage form, the patent contains a claim for the
changed dosage form that has been approved through the issuance of a notice of
compliance in respect of the supplement; or (c) in the case of a change in use of the
medicinal ingredient, the patent contains a claim for the changed use of the medicinal
ingredient that has been approved through the issuance of a notice of compliance in
respect of the supplement.
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations SOR/93-133, §§ 4(2), 4(3) (Can), available at
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In order to gain a better understanding of the patenting patterns associated with
high value drugs, a patent classification system was created for this study. Each patent
deemed relevant to the cohort of 95 drugs was classified in one or more of the following
classes relevant to NDS and SNDS approvals: Chemical Derivative; Chemical Salt;
Chemical Enantiomer; Chemical Crystal; Process Intermediate; Process Preparation;
Delivery; Administration; Combination Therapy; and Use/Indication. Patents were
classified as such based on specific information contained in the claims and description
of each patent analyzed. The detailed patent classification system used to analyze the
data is summarized in Table 2.
TABLE 2. PATENT CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM.
CLASSIFICATION

CODE

Administration

A

Chemical (Crystal)

CC

Chemical (Derivative)

CD

Chemical (Enatiomer)

CE

Chemical (Salt)

CS

Combination Therapy

CT

Delivery

D

Packaging

P

Process (Intermediate)

PI

Process (Preparation)

PP

Use

U

DESCRIPTION
Patent makes a claim(s) regarding the route of administration (e.g.
oral, suppository, intravenous) or dosage forms of the medicinal
ingredient.
Patent makes a claim(s) regarding the crystalline structure of the
medicinal ingredient.
Patent makes a claim(s) regarding a chemical derivative(s) of the
medicinal ingredient obtained via a simple reaction or the
substitution of a functional group.
Patent makes a claim(s) regarding a specific enantiomer of the
medicinal ingredient
Patent makes claim(s) regarding a specific salt form of the
medicinal ingredient
Patent makes claim(s) regarding the therapeutic combination of the
medicinal ingredient with one or more different drug products.
Patent makes claim(s) regarding the in vivo delivery and bioavailability of the medicinal ingredient.
Patent makes claim(s) regarding the function and aesthetics of the
commercial and non-commercial packaging of the medicinal
ingredient.
Patent makes claim(s) regarding the chemical intermediates
required in the manufacturing process of the medicinal ingredient.
Patent makes claim(s) regarding the process and methods of
manufacture of the medicinal ingredient.
Patent makes claim(s) regarding the medical indication for which
the medicinal ingredient provides cure or alleviation of symptoms.

E. Therapeutic Class
¶32

In addition to classifying patent types, each of the 95 drugs studied was also
classified in relation to its therapeutic class. The therapeutic class was assessed using the
World Health Organization’s Anatomical Therapeutic Classification (ATC) System. As
described on the WHO website, 64 the ATC classification divides drugs into groups

http://laws.justice.gc.ca/PDF/Regulation/S/SOR-93-133.pdf.
64
World Health Organization, Collaborating Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology,
http://www.whocc.no/atcddd/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2010).
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according to the organ or system on which they act and their chemical, pharmacological
and therapeutic properties. The broadest level of classification is the “First Level,” which
represents the fourteen primary anatomical sites of drug action. The WHO ATC
classification system used to analyze therapeutic class is summarized in Table 3.
TABLE 3. FIRST LEVEL WHO ANATOMICAL THERAPEUTIC CLASS SYSTEM.
CODE
A
B
C
D
G
H
J
L
M
N
P
R
S
V

CLASSIFICATION
Alimentary Tract and Metabolism
Blood and Blood Forming Organs
Cardiovascular
Dermatological
Genito-Urinary and Sex hormones
Systemic Hormonal (excluding Sex and Insulin)
Systemic Anti-infectives
Antineoplastic and Immunomodulatory
Musculo-Skeletal
Nervous System
Antiparasitic, Insecticides, Repellents
Respiratory
Sensory
Various

F. Data Analysis
¶33

Drug approval, drug patenting, and patent listing data were identified, collected and
analyzed as described previously. 65 Similar methods were used for analysis of patent and
drug classification results. All data were statistically analyzed and graphed using a
combination of Excel, Access (Microsoft. Corp.), and GraphPad Prism (Graphpad
Software Inc.).
¶34
General patenting and patent listing data were fit using a number of parametric
functions, including: a Gumbel-Min function of the form f(x)= A•[(1/σ)•exp(((x-µ)/σ)exp((x-µ)/σ))]; a Gompterz sigmoid function of the form f(x) = A•[exp(b•exp(c•exp(d(xe))]; a normal Gaussian function of the form f(x)= A•[(1/2πσ)^(1/2)•exp(-1/2•exp((xµ)/σ)^2)]; and a Log Pearson III fit of the form f(x)= A•[(1/x|β|Γ(α)•((ln(x)-γ)/β)^(α1)•exp((ln(x)-γ)/β)] where Γ(α) is the gamma function. Goodness of fit to the data was
assessed using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov goodness of fit test.
¶35
Patenting data were further explored in Fig. 4 using linear regression and
exponential analyses. Total patenting data were fit to a four parameter single exponential
function of the form: A•exp(b•(Y-d))+B, where A is amplitude, B is the rate constant of
the exponential function and Y is calendar year. All parameters were allowed to ‘float.’

65

Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 48; Ron A. Bouchard, Jamil Swani, Chirs McLelland, Monika
Sawicka & Richard W. Hawkins, The Pas de Deux of Pharmaceutical Regulation and Innovation: Who’s
Leading Whom?, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1459 (forthcoming 2010) [hereinafter Bouchard, Regulation],
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1409143.
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We also tested a two-parameter single exponential equation of the form: A•exp(b•(Y-V),
where V was fixed at 1977 (the beginning of the data set) or 1993 (the coming into force
date of the linkage regulations regime). We further probed whether the coming into force
of the linkage regulations regime resulted in a different exponential function using a
linear regression analysis. Data were fit by an exponential functional of the form: Y= α •
exp[(β 0 +β 1 I)t+ε], where Y is total patents, ε is a noise term with zero mean and constant
variance, t is the year, and I is an indicator variable taking on the value 1 for year 1993
and later, and zero otherwise. A log transform was used to test the null hypothesis that
β 1 =0 using linear regression.
IV. RESULTS
A. Cohort
1. Drug Patenting & Patent Listing
¶36

Patenting and patent listing data for the full cohort of 95 drugs (Cohort) are shown
in Fig. 2. A total of 3,850 patents were granted in relation to the Cohort (). This
amounted to an average of 40 patents per drug (40.5:1.0). Patenting occurred over a
relatively long period of almost 35 years, from 1977 to the final year analyzed (2008). A
significant take-off point of patenting from baseline levels occurred about 1983, with
peak patenting in 2003. The distribution of patenting data over time followed a general
bell-shaped pattern that was strongly skewed to the left. The fit to the total patent data in
Fig. 2a is a Gumbel-Min distribution, with an R2= 0.9582. For reasons discussed in
relation to Fig. 3, this function was selected over others as providing the best overall
visual fit to the data. Cumulative patents for the Cohort rose over time in a manner that
was well fit by a sigmoidal function (; R2=0.9962). The most rapid phase of patenting
occurred between 1994 and 2004, with peak patenting activity taking place by about
2006.
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a

b

c

d

Fig 2. Patenting and Patent Listing Patterns Associated with Cohort. a Total patents issued by year
(), cumulative number of patents (), total patents listed on the patent register by year (), and
cumulative number of patents listed on the patent register (). Data are for the Cohort of 95 drugs and are
the sum of data for all sub-groups analyzed (Most Profitable; Priority Review; NOC/c, and PR-NOC/c).
Note the convergence of cumulative issued and cumulative listed patents over the test period. b Total ()
and average () number of patents on approved drugs plotted as a function of the time after the priority
date on which the first patent on the subset was issued. c Method used to calculate the temporal gap
between the average date of drug approval on the Cohort (2004) and the 10th (M 10 ), 50th (M 50 ) and 100th
(M 100 ) percentile of maximal drug patenting and patent listing data. Data are those from the cumulative
number of patents () above. d Graph expressing the temporal relationship between drug approval, drug
patenting and patent listing. Bars indicate M 10 , M 50 and M 100 values for Patents per Year (PY), Cumulative
Patents per Year (CPY) and Cumulative Patents Registered on the patent register per Year (CPRY). Time
points are calculated as the difference between the date of average drug approval (NOC) and x (NOC-x),
where x= the date of the 10th, 50th and 100th percentile of patenting, cumulative patenting and patent listing,
respectively.

¶37

Fig. 2b (top) gives the same patent data re-plotted as a function of the year after the
first patent on the Cohort was issued. The distribution of patenting activity expressed as
the year after first instance rose and fell in a general bell-shaped pattern (), with
patenting activity peaking over a prolonged period of 8 to 16 years after the priority date
for first patent on the group. The fit to the data is a conventional Gaussian distribution,
with R2= 0.8779. The peak of the Gaussian fit was 14 years after the priority date on first
patent. As illustrated in the lower data set in Fig. 2b (), average patenting activity
peaked at about 2.5 patents per product per year. Patenting activity remained at this level
between the 8th and 16th year after the first patent on the Cohort was granted.
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Fig. 2a also shows the manner in which patents for the Cohort were listed on the
patent register. Of the 3,850 patents associated with the Cohort, 196 were listed on the
patent register between 1993 and 2008 (). Thus, about 5% of all patents granted to
brand-name pharmaceutical firms were listed on the patent register under the linkage
regulations in order to block generic entry. The distribution of patenting listing expressed
per calendar year for the entire Cohort peaked at about 25 patents per year around 2005.
The time course for cumulative listed patents () was well described by a sigmoid
function (R2=0.9976). The slope of patent listing was greatest between 2000 and 2005
with an apparent peak in 2008. The curves for cumulative patents () and the fraction of
these patents that were listed on the patent register () converged over time, supporting
the conclusion that brand-name firms are listing patents that are relevant to an already
marketed product on the patent register in a timely and efficient fashion in order to delay
generic entry. 66
¶39
The data in Figs. 2a and 2b indicate that drugs in the Cohort were subject to
strong patent protection and that a significant number of these patents were listed on the
patent register in order to prohibit generic entry. Given the close relation between drug
patenting and patent listing, we were interested in further probing the timing between
drug approval, drug patenting and patent listing. From each of the curves in Fig. 2a we
calculated three values: the 10th (M 10 ; filled bars), 50th (M 50 ; hatched bars) and (c) 100th
(M 100 ; open bars) percentile of normalized maximum values. Each of the three values
was then plotted as a function of the average date on which the Cohort received
marketing approval (2004). This was done to obtain a measure of the delay between drug
approval, drug patenting, and patent listing. The procedure is demonstrated for
cumulative patent listing data in Fig. 2c ().

66
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Fig 3. Goodness of Fit for Patent Distribution Expressed per Calendar Year. Total patents plotted by
calendar year () fit to a Gumbel-Min, b conventional Gaussian, and c Log-Pearson functions. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test was used as a goodness of fit test for the relationship of data points to the
functions chosen. K-S statistics for Gumbel-Min, Gaussian and Person functions were 0.1037, 0.1073, and
0.1699, respectively. Data were also poorly fit to the sum of two normal Gaussian distributions (d). The
Pearson function fit the low rising component and peak component well, but did not fit the second more
rapid component well. The single Gaussian missed both the slow and rapid rising phases and only fitted the
peak portion of the bell-shaped data set. By contrast, the Gumbel-Min function fit the rapidly rising, peak
and descending portions of the data set, leaving the slowly rising lower amplitude portion poorly fit. As the
Gumbel-Min had the best K-S score and visually fit the data sets the most accurately of the fits tested, it
was used for comparative purposes from this point forward.

¶40

The procedure described above differs slightly from that used in our pilot study of
drug patenting and patent listing for a smaller cohort of most profitable drugs (n=16). 67
There, we calculated the inflection point at which the data deviated most strongly from
baseline values, as well as the point at which each curve reached the 50th and 95th
percentile of maximum values. The inflection point was calculated as the zero point of
the second derivative of fits to the data. The reason for using a different method in the
present work is that total patenting activity in our pilot study was reasonably well fit
using a Gaussian distribution. By contrast, the skewed relationship observed with a much
larger data set (n=95 drugs; Fig. 2a) resulted in a slow rather than sharp and a,
potentially, bimodal rise in patenting activity, necessitating use of simpler M 10 , M 50 and
M 100 values.

67

Id. at 1496-97.
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¶41

As illustrated in Fig 2d, there was a significant lag between the date on which drug
approval was granted and the dates on which patents on the same drug product were
granted. This gap was observed independent of whether patents were expressed by year
of grant (Patent per Year; PY) or cumulatively (Cumulative Patents per Year; CPY), and
likely reflects the regulatory lag between drug patenting and drug approval. As patenting
activity shifted from 10% to 50% and eventually 100% maximal values, the gap between
M 10 , M 50 and M 100 values and date of average drug approval (NOC-x) progressively
declined. Even so, M 10 and M 50 remained 4-15 years earlier than the date of average
approval for patenting expressed per year and cumulative patenting.
¶42
The data were different for patent listing. As demonstrated in Fig. 2d, average M 10
and M 50 data for cumulative patents listed on the register per year (Cumulative Patents
Registered per Year; CPRY) exceeded the null point by only 4 and 0.5 years compared to
12 and 5 years for CPY. Therefore, both the take-off point (M 10 ) and the point of half
maximal (M 50 ) patent listing occurred much closer to the date of average drug approval
for the Cohort compared to patenting activity expressed per year or cumulative patenting.
In fact, data points for 50% and 100% CPRY were 0.5 and -4.0 years on either side of the
null point.
¶43
The data in Fig. 2d show that the lag between the average date of drug approval
and the average date of cumulative patent listing decreased progressively over the course
of the test period. For example, the differential between M 10 and M 100 values decreased
from 15.75 years for PY, to 8.5 years for CPY, and 0.25 years for CPRY. Ironically, the
average date of approval for the Cohort drugs was actually 4 years later than the average
date of cumulative patent listing (NOC-x = -4.0). The likely reason for this result is the
relative speed and flexibility of the process for patent listing compared to that for drug
approval. Patent listing occurs on the order of days. This is a much shorter time frame
than that for even supplemental (SNDS) drug approval, which occurs over a shorter time
span than conventional new (NDS) drug approval. Combined, the data suggest that
patent listing under linkage regulations may be a better proxy for drug approval (and thus
potentially a better surrogate for drug development incentives) than drug patenting per se.
¶44
As demonstrated in Fig. 2a, the distribution of patenting data over time was far
from symmetrical and therefore was not Gaussian in nature. The distribution skewed
strongly to the left. There was a slow lead up of patenting activity for the years leading
up to the coming into force of linkage regulations in 1993. From that point onwards, the
data were more in line with a conventional bell-shaped distribution. This raises the
question of whether there is more than one underlying process contributing to total
patenting activity and, if so, what its characteristics might be. In order to determine
which statistical distribution best fits the patenting data for the Cohort, we tested a wide
array of statistical distributions (n=61) 68 for goodness of fit using the KolmogorovSmirnov goodness of fit test. The best scoring distribution across the data set was the
68

Beta, Burr, Burr (4P), Cauchy, Chi-Squared, Chi-Squared (2P), Dagum, Dagum (4P), Erlang,
Erlang (3P), Error, Error Function, Exponential, Exponential (2P), Fatigue Life, Fatigue Life (3P), Frechet,
Frechet (3P), GammaGamma (3P), Gen. Extreme Value, Gen. Gamma, Gen. Gamma (4P), Gen. Pareto,
Gumbel Max, Gumbel Min, Hypersecant, Inv. Gaussian, Inv. Gaussian (3P), Johnson SB, Johnson SU,
Kumaraswamy, Laplace, Levy, Levy (2P), Log-Gamma, Logistic, Log-Logistic, Log-Logistic (3P),
Lognormal, Lognormal (3P), Log-Pearson 3, Nakagami, Normal, Pareto, Pareto 2, Pearson 5,
Pearson 5 (3P), Pearson 6, Pearson 6 (4P), Pert, Power Function, Rayleigh, Rayleigh (2P), Reciprocal,
Rice, Student's t, Triangular, Uniform, Weibull, Weibull (3P).

196

Vol. 8:2]

Ron A. Bouchard et al.

Gumbel-Min distribution (0.1037 K-S Score), followed by the Log-Pearson III
distribution (0.1073 K-S Score). For comparison purposes, the normal Gaussian
distribution is also shown, which had a K-S score of 0.1699. Data and fits for the three
distributions are provided in Figs. 3a-c. The Pearson function fit the low rising
component and peak component well, but did not fit the second more rapid component
well. The single Gaussian missed both the slow and rapid rising phases and only fit the
peak portion of the bell-shaped data set. By contrast, the Gumbel-Min function fit the
rapidly-rising, peak and descending portions of the data set, leaving the slowly rising
lower amplitude portion poorly fit. As the Gumbel-Min had the best K-S score and
visually fit the data sets the most accurately of the fits tested, it was used for visual
comparative purposes from this point forward.
¶45
The fits in Figs. 3a-3b suggest that there may be two components to the rising
phase of the patenting curve. We attempted to further characterize this possibility in a
number ways. The first step was to determine if the data represented the sum of two bellshaped distributions. We fit the data to two Gaussian functions; one from 1977 to 1993
and the other from 1993 to 2009. The break point of 1993 was selected as this is where
the slower component of patenting appeared to evolve into a faster component on visual
inspection. As shown in Fig. 3d, the data were not well fit using this procedure. In
particular, data points between 1991 and 1996, encompassing the potential transition
point from a slow to fast component, were very poorly fit. Also, the declining phase of
patenting activity between 2005 and 2009 was poorly fit. Thus, we concluded the data
did not represent a sum of two Gaussian functions.
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a

b

Fig 4. Fit of Cohort Patenting Data to Exponential Functions. Data were fit to two single exponential
functions using two different procedures. In panel a, data were split into two epochs; 1977-1993 () and
1993-2001 (), the point of maximal rate of increase in patenting activity. Data were then fit to a sum of
two single exponential 4 parameter functions as described in the Results. Solid and dashed lines are fits to
epochs one and two, respectively. Amplitudes and time constants were 12.60 0.1467 and 30.24 and 0.2875
for the first and second epochs respectively. The fits suggest the presence of a small and slower phase of
patenting followed by a larger and faster phase. In panel b, linear regression analysis was undertaken to
probe whether a year-specific change in the patent regime in 1993 resulted in a second exponential
function. We assumed a data generating process with the functional form: Y= α•exp[(β0+β1 I)t+ε], where
Y is total patents, ε is a noise term with zero mean and constant variance, t is the year, and I is an indicator
variable taking on the value 1 for year 1993 and later, and zero otherwise. A log transform allowed testing
of the null hypothesis (β1= 0) using linear regression. The result (p=0.006955) suggests there is a shift in
the exponential growth of patenting in 1993. Raw data () are the same as those in a.

¶46

We next assessed whether the data might represent the sum of two exponential
components. Data were again split into two epochs. The first was from 1977 to 1993
and the second was from 1993 to 2001, the point of maximal rate of increase in patenting
activity. As illustrated in Fig. 4a, the data could be well fit to a sum of two single
exponentials of the form: A•exp(b•(Y-d))+B, where A is amplitude, B is the rate constant
of the exponential function and Y is calendar year. All four parameters were allowed to
float (i.e., were not fixed). A 1 and A 2 were 12.60 and 30.24 for the 1977-1993 and 19932001 epochs, respectively, suggesting the presence of two components of patenting in the
data set. The time constants, representing the rate of change of patenting functions, were
0.1467 and 0.2875 for τ 1 and τ 2 , respectively. Thus, the growth rate was much faster for
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the second larger amplitude phase of patenting (1/0.2875= 3.48 years) compared to the
smaller and slower first phase of patenting (a/0.1467= 6.82 years). In other words, the
amount of patenting was 2.5x greater and 2.0x faster in between 1993-2001 than between
1977-1993. A similar result was obtained when a 2-parameter equation was used:
A•exp(b•(Y-V)), where V is a fixed parameter (1977 or 1993). A 1 , A 2 , τ 1 and τ 2 , were
5.4058, 73.5989, 0.1772 and 0.1971, respectively. Thus, for both 2 and 4 parameter
exponentials, there was a large, fast and later phase of patenting superimposed on a
relatively small, slower and earlier phase of patenting. 69
¶47
A linear regression analysis was undertaken to probe whether a year-specific
change in the patent regime in 1993 resulted in a second exponential function (Fig. 4b).
We assumed a data generating process with the functional form: Y= α•exp[(β 0 +β 1 I)t+ε],
where Y is total patents, ε is a noise term with zero mean and constant variance, t is the
year, and I is an indicator variable taking on the value 1 for year 1993 and later, and zero
otherwise. A log transform allowed testing of the null hypothesis (β 1 = 0) using simple
linear regression. The associated p-value of 0.006955 supports the conclusion that there
is a shift in the exponential growth of patenting in 1993. However, the negative sign on
the coefficient suggests that the growth in total patenting follows a slightly slower growth
exponential after 1993 than before. Both approaches in Fig. 4 assume underlying
exponential functions. The first allows more parameters to shift, but does not test whether
the change in 1993 is statistically significant. The second allows only one parameter to
change, but includes a hypothesis test to demonstrate that the change is statistically
significant, and therefore we may conclude that the regime change had a measurable
effect. This shows up in a slight bump in 1993. Since the change in legal framework
would suggest a shift at this time, and because the hypothesis test confirms that a change
took place, we conclude that the growth in total patenting was affected when the linkage
regime came into force in 1993.

69
A significant difference, however, was that the rate constant for the second phase (1/0.1971= 5.07
years) was only slightly faster than for the first phase (1/0.1772= 5.64 years) when V is fixed. Indeed when
the second epoch is broadened from 2001 to 2003 the rate constant in years was actually larger (7.75 and
5.96 years) than that for the first epoch for both the four and two parameter tests. This result, which likely
reflects an incomplete data base towards the end of the test period, is discussed more fully in the
Limitations section below.
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Fig 5. Analysis of Average Year to Peak Patenting per Drug for Cohort. The number of drugs with
patents peaking in a given year is provided on top of each symbol (), which represents the average
number of drugs with peak patenting activity in a given year. Numerical values at the bottom of symbols
represent the total number of patents for drugs. The data demonstrate a continuing trend towards faster peak
patenting per drug over the term 1976 to 2000. The average year of first patent instance for the Cohort was
1986.

¶48

We next investigated changes in global patterns of peak patenting per drug for the
Cohort. Fig. 5 shows the results of an analysis of changes in the average time it took for
peak patenting per drug over the course of the period 1977 to 2000 for the 95 drugs in the
Cohort. Data are expressed as the time after the year of first issuance of a patent for a
given drug. This was done to probe the patenting behavior of pharmaceutical firms over
the test period. Drugs were included in the analysis only if their patenting activity clearly
peaked prior to 2008. As indicated by the numbers on top of relevant symbols () the
number of drugs per calendar year was dispersed fairly evenly, with slight peaks in 1978
and in between 1987 and 1990. Similarly, the numbers in brackets at the bottom of the
symbols demonstrate that the number of cumulative patents per category per year was
also dispersed fairly evenly over the test period.
¶49
During the first 4 years of the test period (1977-1980) the average year to peak
patenting activity was about 25 years. For the 5 years between 1986 and 1991 this value
declined to about 15 years, and decreased further to 8 years for the 5 year period between
1996 and 2000. Thus, there was a reduction of the time to peak patenting from a
maximum of 25 years in 1979 to a minimum of 7.5 years in 2000. This equals a 330
percent increase in the rate of maximal patenting per drug over the course of 20 years.
While this conclusion is somewhat tentative given the lower numbers of patents towards
the end of the test period, the data suggest that pharmaceutical firms have become
significantly more efficient in their patenting efforts over time. This conclusion is
consistent with the substantial growth in patent listing in the last decade, the convergence
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of patenting and patent listing data, and the decreasing time lag between drug approval
and drug patenting and patent listing (Figs. 2a-2d).
2. Patent Class
¶50

Patents associated with the Cohort were further investigated according to the patent
classification scheme described in the Methods. Both the absolute number of patents per
classification and the average number of classifications per drug were calculated. Fig. 6a
shows data expressed as the average number of patents per drug for each group. There
were 5,859 individual patent classifications associated with the Cohort of 95 drugs. This
amounted to an average of about 62 (61.67) patent classifications per drug. Patents for
the Cohort were distributed in three numerical bins: 1-5 patents per drug, 6-10 patents per
drug and greater than 10 patents per drug. The majority of classifications (7/11, or 64%)
had 1-5 patents per drug that were widely dispersed throughout the classification system.
Most of these patents were directed to intermediate processes and chemical forms,
particularly the latter. Specific chemical forms were, in order of prevalence: chemical
derivatives (C D ), chemical crystalline forms (C C ), chemical salts (C S ) and chemical
enantiomers (C E ). Only three of the classifications contained drugs with 6-10 patents
each. These were directed to patent on uses, routes of administration and processes of
preparation. The classification with the largest number of patents per drug was
combination therapies (C T ). This class had a peak of 23 patents per drug, representing by
far the largest patent classification. The rank order of patent classification for the Cohort
was: C T >>AUP P >>C D DP IC C C E C S I. Raw data are provided in Table 5.
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Fig 6. Patent Classifications and Drug Classifications for Cohort. a Bar graph illustrating patent
classifications for the Cohort of 95 drugs. There were 5,859 individual patent classifications associated
with the Cohort, amounting to 61 classifications per drug. The majority of classifications (7/11) had 1-5
patents per drug widely dispersed throughout the classification system. Most were directed to intermediate
processes and chemical forms, particularly chemical derivatives, chemical crystalline forms, chemical salts
and chemical enantiomers. Two classifications contained drugs with 6-10 patents each. These were directed
to patent on uses and routes of administration. Combination therapies was the largest class, with 23 patents
per drug. Panels b-d are bar graphs showing data for the Cohort analyzed with respect to the First Level
WHO Anatomic Therapeutic Class drug classification scheme. Data are expressed as number of drugs in
the Cohort per ATC class (b), number of patents in the Cohort per ATC class (c) and number of patents per
drug per ATC class (d). Details of both classification systems are described in Methods.

¶51

In addition to the detailed patent classification scheme described above, we also
derived a simplified patent classification scheme. The rationale for undertaking this
procedure was that patents are often referred to simply as ‘chemical’, ‘process’,
‘combination’ or ‘use’ patents. For convenience, the Delivery and Packaging classes in
the detailed scheme were folded into the Administration class. The 5,859 classifications
were directed fairly broadly to combination (36.7%), route of administration (23.9%), use
(15.0%), process (12.7%) and chemical (12%) patents. The rank order of general patent
classifications was C T >A>UPC. Raw data for the Cohort are provided in Table 6. The
large number of patents and patent classifications associated with the Cohort (Fig. 6;
Tables 5 and 6) indicate there is a large ‘pool’ of highly diverse patents from which to
draw for both NDS and SNDS submission and patent listing purposes.
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Therapeutic Class

¶52

The final analysis for the Cohort was by WHO therapeutic class. Generally, the
drugs analyzed in this study fell into 10 of the 14 WHO ATC classes. As illustrated in
Fig. 6b, the Cohort of 95 drugs could be divided into three discrete groups: 0-5; 5-15 and
greater than 15 drugs per class. The largest group was Antineoplastic/Immunomodulator
(n=23). The second largest was composed of Alimentary Tract & Metabolism (n=12),
Cardiovascular System (n=16), Systemic Anti-infectives (n=15), and Nervous System
(n=15) classes. Together these groupings accounted for the large majority of drugs (81 of
95; 85.26%). The remaining 14 drugs were dispersed among five further classes with
much smaller values: Blood & Blood Forming Organs (n=2); Musculo-Skeletal System
(n=3); Respiratory System (n=5); Sensory Organs (n=2); and Various (n=2). The rank
order of WHO classifications for the Cohort was for L>CJNA>>RMBSV. Raw data for
the Cohort are provided in Table 7.
¶53
In addition to drugs per therapeutic class, we also analyzed patents per therapeutic
class. Figs. 6c and 6d show a comparison of total patents and patents per drug plotted
against ATC class. As indicated by the data in the bar graphs, there was substantial
variability in the number of patents associated with the various therapeutic classes
depending on whether the data were plotted as total number of patents per class or
average number of patents per drug per class. Of 3,850 patents granted on the entire
Cohort, 46% (n=1,750; 45.5%) were associated with only two therapeutic classes:
Antineoplastic/Immunomodulator (n=900) and Cardiovascular (n=850). A second, and
equally large grouping (n=1725; 44.81%) was composed of Alimentary Tract and
Metabolism (n=400), Nervous System (n=400), Anti-infectives (n=350) and MusculoSkeletal (n=350), and Hormonal (n=225), with remaining patents (10%) split between
Sensory Organs (n=50), Blood Forming Organs (n=5); and Various (n=5). As such, the
rank order of total patents distributed within the WHO ATC classification was:
LC>NMJH>>SBV.
¶54
Fig. 6d shows patents analyzed per drug for the various therapeutic classes. While
the Cohort had on average 40 patents per drug (Fig. 1), the average number of patents per
ATC classification varied tremendously, from a low of 3.5 to a high of 116. The largest
class by far was Musculo-Skeletal drugs, which had an average of 116 patents per drug.
This
was
followed
by
Cardiovascular
(n=55),
Respiratory
(n=45),
Antineoplastic/Immunomodulator (n=38), Alimentary Tract and Metabolism (n=33),
Sensory Organs (n=27), Nervous System (n=25), Anti-infectives (n=25), Blood (n=5) and
Various (n=3.5). The most significant deviation of patenting per ATC class from total
patenting data was that while almost 50% of all patents were distributed within the
Antineoplastic, Immunomodulatory and Cardiovascular classifications (Fig. 6c), peak
patenting activity per drug was associated with a much more broad set of therapeutic
classifications (Fig. 6d). The rank order of patents per drug per ATC class was:
M>CRLA>SNC>BV.
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B. Most Profitable, Priority Review, NOC/c, PR-NOC/c
1. Drug Patenting & Patent Listing
¶55

Patenting and patent listing patterns for most profitable drugs (Most Profitable;
n=33), expedited drug approvals without significant post-market obligations (Priority
Review; n=40), expedited approvals with significant post-market obligations (NOC/c;
n=16) and drugs subject to expedited approval via the Priority Review stream that also
received NOC/c approvals (PR-NOC/c; n=6) are shown in Fig. 7.
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Fig 7. Comparison of Drug Patenting, Cumulative Patenting and Cumulative Patent Listing for Most
Profitable, Priority Review, NOC/c and PR-NOC/c Groups. Data are shown for patents per calendar
year (a), cumulative patenting activity (b) and cumulative patent listing (c) for Most Profitable (), Priority
Review (▼), NOC/c ( ), and PR-NOC/c () groups. Fits to the data are Gumbel Min for panel a and
Gompertz sigmoid functions for panels b-c.

¶56

The patenting and patent listing patterns observed for the four groups were in
general quite similar. As with patenting activity for the Cohort (Fig. 2), patenting
expressed per calendar year had a bell-shaped pattern which was skewed to the left. As
per Fig. 3, all fits to the data are Gumbel-Min functions. Fits were R2= 0.9487 for Most
Profitable (), 0.9329 for Priority Review ▼
( ), 0.9151 for NOC/c ( ) and 0.9606 for
PR-NOC/c () groups, respectively. Peak patenting occurred within a small temporal
window for all four groups (2003-2005). Peak patenting for the Most Profitable group
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(n=179) exceeded that for Priority Review group (n=150) and was a little over three
times (325%) greater than that observed for NOC/c (n=55) and PR-NOC/c (n=56)
groups. The 3-fold increase in patents for the Most Profitable group can be seen both in
the raw (Fig. 7a) and cumulative (Fig. 7b) data, with a more pronounced peak in the
cumulative data. The onset of patenting activity was earliest for Most Profitable drugs,
followed by Priority Review, NOC/c, and PR-NOC/c drugs. While the onset appeared to
be earlier for the PR-NOC/c group compared to the NOC/c group (Fig. 7a), cumulative
patenting activity for both groups was nearly identical (Fig. 7b). All four data sets for
cumulative patenting were well fit by a sigmoid function, with R2 values of 0.9960;
0.9956; 0.9927; and 0.9997 for Most Profitable, Priority Review, NOC/c, and PR-NOC/c
groups, respectively. Peak cumulative patenting followed a similar order as patenting
activity expressed per calendar year: Most Profitable (n=1,846); Priority Review
(n=1,291); NOC/c (n=387); and PR-NOC/c (n=379).
¶57
The data in Figs. 7a and 7b indicate that the large majority of patenting activity
(80%) occurred in relation to Most Profitable and Priority Review drugs, with much
smaller overall patenting levels associated with NOC/c and PR-NOC/c groups. While
true in absolute terms, this conclusion is somewhat tempered when data for expedited
review are parsed in a more nuanced manner. For example, the average number of
patents per drug was 55.9, 31.5, 24.19, and 63.17 for the Most Profitable, Priority
Review, NOC/c, and PR-NOC/c, respectively. Therefore, while the number of patents
per drug in the Most Profitable, Priority Review, NOC/c groups tracked the rank order for
peak patenting per drug by calendar year (Fig. 7a) and cumulative patenting (Fig. 7b),
normalized data indicate (1) that NOC/c drugs did not differ substantially from Priority
Review drugs and (2) that drugs approved with both Priority Review and NOC/c status
(PR-NOC/c) had a disproportionately high number of patents per drug compared to either
Priority Review or NOC/c groups alone. A summary of patent data for all groups studied
is provided in Table 4.
¶58
Fig. 7c shows patent listing data for Most Profitable (), Priority Review ▼
( ),
NOC/c () and PR-NOC/c () groups. In general, data for the listing of patents on the
patent register under the linkage regulations again paralleled that for patenting. The Most
Profitable drugs had the largest number of listed patents (n=110), followed by Priority
Review (n=56), NOC/c (n=23) and PR-NOC/c (11). Thus, firms listed 5.96%, 4.34%,
5.94%, and 2.90% of patents granted in relation to Most Profitable, Priority Review,
NOC/c, and PR-NOC/c drugs, respectively. This can be compared with 5.1% of patents
for the entire Cohort (Fig. 2). Of interest, while the number of average patents per drug
was very large for the PR-NOC/c group compared to the other groups, the fraction of
these patents listed was the smallest for all of the groups studied to date.
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Fig 8. Comparison of Normalized Drug Patenting and Patent Listing Patterns for Most Profitable,
Priority Review, NOC/c and PR-NOC/c Groups. Data are shown for normalized patents per calendar
year (a), cumulative patenting activity (b) and cumulative patent listing (c) for Most Profitable (), Priority
Review (▼), NOC/c ( ), and PR-NOC/c () groups. Fits to the data are Gumbel Min for panel a and
Gompertz sigmoid functions for panels b-c.

TABLE 4. SUMMARY OF DRUG PATENTING DATA.

¶59

PATENTS

Total
N= 95

MP
N=33

PR
N=40

NOC/c
N=16

PR-NOC/c
N=6

Patents
Patents per Drug
Listed Patents
Average Patent Date

3,850
40.5
199
2000

1,846
55.9
110
1999

1,291
32.3
56
2000

387
24.2
23
2001

379
63.2
11
2001

Normalized patenting, cumulative patenting and cumulative patent listing data
within each of the four groups are provided in Figs. 8a-8c. As with the Cohort (Fig. 2),
the general bell-shaped and sigmoidal patterns for normalized patenting and patent listing
data were observed in all four groups. Patenting activity expressed per calendar year
rises and falls with time, and cumulative patenting lagged behind cumulative patent
listing in each case. However, there was an important difference between groups in
relation to the degree to which patenting activity per calendar year was skewed to the left.
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The rank order for leftward skewing was: Most Profitable>Priority Review>>PRNOC/c>NOC/c. The fact that the two groups with the largest patenting activities over
time (Most Profitable and Priority Review) were those that skewed most strongly to the
left explains this tendency in the Cohort (Fig. 2a). Cumulative patenting and patent
listing were both well fit by a sigmoid function. R2 values for cumulative patenting
activity were 0.9960, 0.9956, 0.9927 and 0.9997 for Most Profitable, Priority Review,
NOC/c, and PR-NOC/c, respectively. For the same groups, R2 values for cumulative
patent listing were 0.9977, 0.9979, 0.9923, 0.9775.
¶60
While both cumulative patenting and cumulative patent listing followed sigmoidal
patterns for the four groups studied, there were significant differences between groups.
In particular, the date of onset of patenting and patent listing and the rates of growth to
maximal levels differed between groups. Both cumulative patenting activity and patent
listing were shifted to the right for Priority Review and both NOC/c groups compared
with the Most Profitable group. The apparent take-off point for patenting in the Most
Profitable group was about 1988. This can be compared to the NOC/c and PR-NOC-c
groups, which had apparent take-off points close to 1993, the date on which the NOC
Regulations came into force. A similar pattern emerged in the patent listing data, where
the apparent take-off points for Most Profitable and PR-NOC/c groups appeared to be
about 1995 and 2000, respectively. Similarly, the most rapid phase of cumulative
patenting occurred between 1995 and 2000 for the Most Profitable and Priority Review
groups (Fig. 8b) whereas that for NOC/c and PR-NOC/c groups occurred later, between
2000 and 2004. Data for patent listing paralleled this trend (Fig. 8c). Finally, visual
inspection of the slopes for cumulative patenting and listing activity suggests there may
be different rates of convergence of patenting and patent listing curves over time for the
different groups. Differences in convergence of this nature would be important, as they
may reflect strategic responses by pharmaceutical firms to safety and efficacy signals
generated in both pre-market and post-market phases of drug development.
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Fig 9. Comparison of Temporal Relationship between Drug Approval, Drug Patenting and Patent
Listing for Most Profitable, Priority Review, NOC/c and PR-NOC/c Groups. a-d Bar graphs
illustrating the temporal relationship between drug approval, drug patenting and patent listing. As in Fig.
2d, bars represent M 10 , M 50 and M 100 values for Patents per Year (PY), Cumulative Patents per Year
(CPY) and Cumulative Patents Registered on the patent register per Year (CPRY) for Most Profitable,
Priority Review, NOC/c, and PR-NOC/c groups, respectively. Time points are calculated as the difference
between the date of average drug approval (NOC) and x (NOC-x), where x= the date of the 10th, 50th and
100th percentile of patenting, cumulative patenting and patent listing, respectively.

¶61

Figure 9 shows a more detailed analysis of the relationship between drug approval,
drug patenting and patent listing for Most Profitable, Priority Review, NOC/c, and PRNOC/c groups. As observed for the Cohort (Fig. 2d), there was a significant lag between
the date on which drug approval was granted and the dates on which patents on the same
drug product were granted. This delay gradually declined as patenting activity shifted
from 10% to 50% and 100% maximal values. As observed with general patenting
activity and patent listing (Figs. 7 and 8), there were small but significant differences
between groups. For example, there was a progressive decline in the lag between drug
approval and the 10th, 50th and 100th percentile of maximal patenting per year (PY) from
Most Profitable, to Priority Review, NOC/c and PR-NOC/c. The onset of significant
patenting activity (M 10 ) declined from 19 years, to 16, 13 and 11 years for these groups.
However, at the M 100 level, the lag had reduced to essentially zero for all four groups.
There was even less difference between CPY and CPRY data, which had M 10 , M 50 and
M 100 values within 1-3 years of each other. The rank order for proximity of drug
patenting and patent listing to drug approval was: PR-NOC/c>NOC/c>Priority
Review>Most Profitable. As such, the data demonstrate that the NOC/c regime provides
a highly flexible mechanism for pharmaceutical firms to provide intellectual property
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protection to drugs, even under conditions where they are still in the regulatory approval
phase.
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Fig 10. Comparison of Year to Peak Patenting per Drug for Most Profitable, Priority Review, NOC/c
and PR-NOC/c groups. Symbols represent the average number of drugs with peak patenting activity in a
given year for Most Profitable (), Priority Review▼),
( NOC/c ( ), and PR-NOC/c () groups,
respectively.

¶62

Figure 10 shows a comparison of changes in the average time it took for peak
patenting per drug over the period 1977 to 2000 for the four groups. Data are expressed
as the time after the year of first issuance of a patent for a given drug. Fits are to a
Gumbel-Min function and are for visual inspection purposes only. The data suggest that
the general decline in peak patenting cycles per drug observed for the Cohort in Fig. 5
was reflective of group-specific differences in peak patenting per drug over time. For
example, peak patenting per drug for the Most Profitable group () had a bell-shaped
pattern over time, peaking between 15 and 17 years after the priority date of the first
patent granted on the group. This pattern was repeated from a lower baseline for Priority
Review drugs (▼).
¶63
While the pattern was bell-shaped for Priority Review, it was nevertheless shifted
to the left by 3-4 years. The same was true for the NOC/c () and PR-NOC/c ()
groups, which were shifted down and to the left yet again. Thus, as one moves from
Most Profitable to Priority Review, to NOC/c and eventually PR-NOC/c, peak patenting
occurs at progressively fewer years after the date of the first patent on the group, and this
peak generally involves fewer and fewer patents per drug. A caveat for this conclusion,
as shown clearly by the fits to the raw data, is that even the Gumbel-Min function
provided generally poor fits to the data. R2 values were 0.8437, 0.8391, 0.7228, and
0.8510 for Most Profitable, Priority Review, NOC/c and PR-NOC/c groups, respectively.
Moreover, as discussed in the Limitations section below, the data sets for NOC/c and PRNOC/c are less likely to be complete or nearing completion than those for the Most
Profitable and Priority Review groups. Even so, the data in Fig. 10 demonstrate a slow
but steady downward and leftward shift towards fewer patents and earlier year after first
instance peaks for the groups as described.
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2. Patent Class
Patents associated with Most Profitable, Priority Review, NOC/c, and PR-NOC/c
drugs were assessed according to the patent classification scheme described in the
Methods. Data in Fig. 11 represent patent classifications per drug for each group. As
observed for the Cohort (Fig. 6), all four groups shared a “W”-shaped distribution, with
the Combination Therapy class providing the middle peak and Administration and Use
patents providing generally ascending bookends. There were 5,732 individual patent
classifications associated with the Cohort of 95 drugs. Of these, 2,762, 1,886, 582 and
502 classifications were associated with Most Profitable, Priority Review, NOC/c and
PR-NOC/c groups, respectively. The results differed substantially when the data were
expressed as number of patent classifications per drug: there were 83.7, 46.0, 36.4 and
83.7 classifications per drug for Most Profitable, Priority Review, NOC/c and PR-NOC/c
groups, respectively. Thus, while the PR-NOC/c group had the least number of patent
classifications overall, it had the largest number of patent classifications per drug.
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Fig 11. Comparison of Patent Classifications for Most Profitable, Priority Review, NOC/c and PRNOC/c Groups. a-d Bar graphs illustrating patent classifications per drug for Most Profitable, Priority
Review, NOC/c and PR-NOC/c groups, respectively.
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Patents could be split into four numerical bins for each group: 0-5, 5-10, 10-15 and
greater than 15 patents per drug. The ratio was very similar for each group: 7:1:2:1 for
Most Profitable, 8:2:0:1 for Priority Review, 8:2:1:0 for NOC/c and 7:2:1:1 for PRNOC/c. The most significant difference was in the number of patents per class in the 1015 and 15+ ranges. The largest class was the 15+ category for the PR-NOC/c group (Fig.
11d), which had a maximum of 40 Combination Therapy patents per drug. This can be
compared to 32 (Fig. 11a), 17 (Fig. 11b) and 15 (Fig. 11c) for Most Profitable, Priority
Review, and NOC/c drugs. Administration and Use patent classes represented the two
next largest classifications. PR-NOC/c, Most Profitable, Priority Review, and NOC/c
drugs were associated with 14, 15, 10 and 5 Administration patents on average, while
Use patents were 7, 13, 7 and 10 for PR-NOC/c, Most Profitable, Priority Review, and
NOC/c groups. Of interest, while PR-NOC/c group had by far the lowest number of
drugs (n=6) with the lowest number of patents (n=379), listed patents (n=11), and patent
classifications (n=502), when averaged out for the number of drugs per group each of
these metrics was the highest, or next to the highest, among groups. Raw data for the
detailed classification scheme are provided in Table 5. Rank order classification data are
given in Table 7.
TABLE 5. SUMMARY OF DETAILED PATENT CLASSIFICATION DATA.
PATENT CLASS
Administration
Chemical (Crystal)
Chemical (Derivative)
Chemical (Enatiomer)
Chemical (Salt)
Combination Therapy
Delivery
Packaging
Process (Intermediate)
Process (Preparation)
Use

¶66

Total
N=95
1008
136
439
44
84
2131
284
109
196
551
877

MP
N=33
473
93
176
26
72
1003
150
54
83
294
410

PR
N=40
358
23
156
12
9
686
89
36
71
161
285

NOC/c
N=16
91
4
48
0
0
223
19
9
12
37
139

PR-NOC/c
N=6
82
10
56
1
3
242
25
10
9
24
40

In addition to the detailed patent classification scheme, Most Profitable, Priority
Review, NOC/c and PR-NOC/c drugs were also analyzed via the simplified scheme. The
5,732 classifications were directed broadly to Combination, Route of Administration,
Use, Process, and Chemical patents, the range for which depends on the group studied.
One consistent observation was that the largest group was Combination patents, followed
by either Use or Administration patents. The rank order of general classifications was
C T >>A>UPC for the Most Profitable drugs, C T >A>UPC for Priority review,
C T >UA>CP for NOC/c and C T >A>C>UP. Thus, the general W-shaped pattern breaks
down somewhat when data are analyzed with the general scheme, with NOC/c and PRNOC/c drugs in particular containing a relatively larger fraction of Use and Chemical
patents.
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TABLE 6. SUMMARY OF GENERAL PATENT CLASSIFICATION DATA.

¶67

PATENT CLASS

Total
N=95

MP
N=33

PR
N=40

NOC/c
N=16

PR-NOC/c
N=6

Administration
Chemical
Process
Combination
Use

1401
703
747
2131
877

677
367
377
1003
410

483
200
232
686
285

119
52
49
223
139

117
70
33
242
40

In light of the large allowance for new uses and chemical derivatives allowed under
the definition of New Active Substance (NAS) and Supplemental New Drug Submissions
(SNDS) stream, the larger number of patents making up the Use and Chemical pools
observed here would be attractive to sponsors seeking to obtain patent protection for
follow-on SNDS drugs. Raw data for the general classification scheme are provided in
Table 6. A Comparison of the rank orders for the general classification scheme is
provided in Table 7.
TABLE 7. COMPARISON OF RANK ORDERS FOR PATENT CLASSIFICATIONS.
GROUP
Detailed Classification
Cohort (n=95)
Most Profitable (n=33)
Priority Review (n=40)
NOC/c (n=16)
PR-NOC/c (n=6)
General Classification
Cohort (n=95)
Most Profitable (n=33)
Priority Review (n=40)
NOC/c (n=16)
PR-NOC/c (n=6)

CODE RANK ORDER
C T >>AUP P >>C D DP I C C C E C S I
C T >>AU>P P >C D DC C P I C S C E P
C T >>AU>P P C D DP I C S C E PC C
C T >UA>P P C D DP I PC C C S C E
C T >>A>C D U>P P DC C P I PC S C E
C T >A>UPC
C T >>A>UPC
C T >A>UPC
C T >UA>CP
C T >A>C>UP

3. Therapeutic Class
¶68

Finally, the four groups were analyzed by WHO therapeutic class. Unlike the
Cohort analysis (Fig. 6), the data shown in Fig. 12 for Most Profitable, Priority Review,
NOC/c and PR-NOC/c groups did not fall into a broad range of therapeutic classes. Data
for each group fell into one of only two numerical bins: those with 0-5 drugs per ATC
class and those with 5-10 drugs per class. The ratio of drugs in each group was 2:3, 7:3,
2:1 and 3:0 for Most Profitable, Priority Review, NOC/c and PR-NOC/c drugs,
respectively.
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Fig 12. Comparison of First Level WHO ATC Drug Classifications for Most Profitable, Priority
Review, NOC/c and PR-NOC/c Groups. a-d Bar graphs illustrating drug classifications for Most
Profitable, Priority Review, NOC/c and PR-NOC/c groups. Bars represent the number of drugs in each
group per ATC class, respectively.

¶69

Both NOC/c and PR-NOC/c had only 3 classifications each in total, while even the
Most Profitable group only had 5. The group with the largest number of classifications
(Priority Review) was also that where ATC classifications were distributed most broadly.
While there was no repetitive pattern between groups, generally the largest ATC classes
were Alimentary Tract & Metabolism (A), Cardiovascular System (C), Systemic Antiinfectives (J), and Antineoplastic/Immunomodulator (L), with an average of 10 drugs per
therapeutic class in most groups studied. Raw data for the Cohort and Most Profitable,
Priority Review and NOC/c groups are provided in Table 8. Rank orders for the groups
are given in Table 9.
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TABLE 8. SUMMARY OF WHO DRUG CLASSIFICATION DATA.
DRUG CLASS
Alimentary Tract/Metabolism
Cardiovascular
Systemic Anti-infectives
Antineoplastic/Immunomodulatory
Nervous System
Blood/Blood Forming Organs
Musculo-Skeletal
Respiratory
Sensory
Various

Total
N= 95

MP
N=33

PR
N=40

NOC/c
N=16

PR-NOC/c
N=6

12
16
15
23
15
2
3
5
2
2

10
11
3
7
2
-

2
6
11
7
3
2
2
3
2
2

2
10
4
-

2
3
1
-

TABLE 9. COMPARISON OF RANK ORDERS FOR WHO DRUG CLASSIFICATIONS.
GROUP

CODE RANK ORDER

Cohort (n=95)
Most Profitable (n=33)
Priority Review (n=40)
NOC/c (n=16)
PR-NOC/c (n=6)

L>CJNA>>RMBSV
CAN>LR
JLC>NRABMSV
L>NJ
LJM

C. Limitations
¶70

Patenting over time for the Cohort and most of the sub-groups studied followed a
general bell-shaped pattern over time expressed per calendar year in absolute terms (Fig.
2a), year after first patent instance (Fig. 2b) or following normalization for maximal
values (Fig. 8a). As described in detail in Fig. 3, the distribution was not Gaussian in
nature (single or double). The distribution of patenting skewed strongly to the left, with a
slow gradual phase of patenting activity from 1977 to about 1993, followed by a larger
and potentially faster component of patenting. As illustrated by the two procedures
shown in Figs. 4a and 4b, these phases were well fit to the sum of two single exponential
functions with a break point around 1993, the year the NOC Regulations came into force.
That two exponential processes were identified using two different methods strongly
suggests that firm patenting activities have been significantly affected by the enactment
of the linkage regulations.
¶71
A significant limitation of the analysis described in the preceding paragraph is that
the descending phase of the bell curve could be an artifact of analyzing an ongoing
process. This would be consistent with the observation that the rate (although not the
amplitude) of the second phase of patenting after 1993 was slower than the first phase
under certain conditions (e.g., broadening the second epoch from 1993-2001 to 19932003). There are reasons, however, to speculate that a true descending phase may prevail
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with a longer observation period. First, patenting activity on the Cohort and sub-groups
may reflect a process that is ongoing, but at a reduced rate. This is consistent with the
differences in the average date of patenting for drugs already deemed “most profitable”
by the marketplace (1999) compared to drugs which have more recently been approved
via either the NOC/c or PR-NOC/c expedited review stream (2001). The observations
that the listing of patents on the patent register declines after peaking (Fig. 2a) and peak
patenting per drug over time has declined considerably in the last two decades (Figs. 5
and 10) may also be supportive evidence for this conclusion.
¶72
Further evidence for a legitimate declining phase is provided by amendments made
to the NOC Regulations. Two sets of changes were made to the linkage regulations
between 2004 and 2007 that may have hastened both existing office actions at the PTO
and patent listing. As noted above, under the provisions of domestic linkage regulations,
each patent listed on the patent register must be demonstrated in litigation to be invalid or
not infringed for generic market entry. Prior to amendments in 2006, 70 any patent listed
on the register had to be successfully overcome in litigation. Up to this time, it was
possible to list patent on the register shortly before an NOC was granted to a generic firm
or shortly after a generic firm had “won” on all contested patents to date (i.e.,
successfully demonstrated that all patents listed were either invalid or not infringed).
However, as recognized earlier by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission in its investigation
of evergreening under Hatch-Waxman, 71 practices such as these result in abuse of the
automatic stay provision. Following the 2006 amendments, generic firms are only
obliged to litigate patents listed before its Notice of Allegation is filed. As such, only
patents listed before litigation is initiated can be used by brand-name firms to trigger the
automatic injunction. The second amendment was in relation to the relevance
requirement. As discussed supra, early appellate jurisprudence rejected a strict relevance
requirement, opting instead for a reading such that patents need only be relevant to a
medicine rather than the drug form specifically approved by regulators. 72 However, this
was altered in 2006 when amendments were made such that listed patents were required
to contain at least one specific claim to the medical ingredient, formulation, dosage form
or use for which approval was granted. 73

70

See generally the 2006 amendments to the NOC Regulations, the accompanying 2006 RIAS, and the
2009 Guidance Document summarizing the jurisprudence and policy grounds supporting a specific
relevance requirement for patent listing and the timing of patent listing relevant to a generic Notice of
Allegation, supra note 38.
71
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY
(2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf. For a discussion of evergreening
under Hatch Waxman, see Caffrey & Rotter, supra note 15, at 13-14.
72
Eli Lilly Canada v. Canada, [2003] 3 F.C. 140 (Can.).
73
See AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Canada, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 560, 2006 SCC 49 (Can.).
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Fig 13. Comparison of Drug Patenting, Cumulative Patenting and Cumulative Patent Listing for the
Cohort, Most Profitable, Priority Review, NOC/c and PR-NOC/c Groups in the Absence of Data for
Celecoxib. Raw data are shown for patents per calendar year (a), cumulative patenting activity (b) and
cumulative patent listing (c) for the Cohort (), Most Profitable (▲), Priority Review (▼), NOC/c ( ),
and PR-NOC/c () groups after subtracting PR-NOC/c data for the selective COX-2 inhibitor celecoxib
(Celebrex™).

¶73

The importance of these amendments to the present work is a potential escalating
effect on the rate of patenting and patent listing in between at least 2004 and 2007, as
firms were first consulted by government during the RIAS phase and then later involved
in accelerated listing and litigation activities in anticipation of these two loopholes
closing. At some point however, patenting and patent listing would eventually decline
back to a certain equilibrium as the deadline for listing would be fixed to the date of
generic Notice of Allegation as well as the date on which all patents on the register were
shown in litigation to be either invalid or not infringed by the generic product. At this
point we would expect to see a descending portion of a bell-shaped distribution, but
skewed at its earlier stages. However, it is not yet clear that this point has been reached
in the present analysis.
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A second limitation of the analysis was that the PR-NOC/c results described in
Figs. 7-12 were strongly influenced by patenting and patent listing data associated with
just one drug, celecoxib. 74 Including data for this drug in the PR-NOC/c group had the
effect of increasing total patenting per year and cumulative patenting to the level of the
NOC/c group (Figs. 7a and 7b) and shifting cumulative patenting (Fig. 8b) and patent
listing (Fig. 8c) to the left compared to the NOC/c group. As illustrated by the raw data
in Fig 13, when the results for celecoxib are subtracted, there is a progressive trend
downward and to the right for peak, cumulative, and normalized patenting and patent
listing with a clear and distinct rank order of: Cohort>Most Profitable>Priority
Review>NOC/c>PR-NOC/c. While this renders the visual representation and separation
of the data visually cleaner, we nevertheless felt it was appropriate to include all data for
the PR-NOC/c group. The rationale for this strategy was that celecoxib is an excellent
example of the type of drug regulators hope to see going through expedited review and
onto Most Profitable status.
V. DISCUSSION

¶75

Our analysis of drug approvals, drug patenting and patent listing under linkage
regulations yields a number of important observations. First, the data demonstrates that
both the traditional patent and emerging linkage regulation regimes are heavily used by
pharmaceutical firms. Data on the Cohort of 95 drugs indicate that for every drug
marketed there were at least 40 patents per drug and of these about 5% were listed on the
patent register in order to prevent generic entry. While 5% may seem a small fraction for
listing, strategic placement of a very small number of patents on the patent register over
time has been empirically shown to effectively double the period of patent protection on
blockbuster drugs, from an average term of 22 years to a term of 43 years. 75
¶76
Second, the data show increasing use of linkage regulations over time. When
analyzed in relation to drug approval data, the results suggest that intellectual property
protection via linkage regulations may in fact be a better proxy for innovation by firms
than drug patenting per se. Combined, the patent and linkage regulation regimes provide
substantial legal protection for high value pharmaceuticals. Indeed, over the last three
decades, firms have engaged in progressively faster drug approval, patenting and patent
listing in order to broaden the area fenced in by these mechanisms.
¶77
Third, the array of patent classifications supporting this endeavour is substantial,
encompassing a broad range of chemical, use, process, combination, and delivery patents.
These patents can in turn be used to support both a broad array of “new” and “follow-on”
drug approvals and for patent listing purposes in order to prevent generic entry on already
approved drugs. Fourth, patents identified in this study are directed to a broad scope of
therapeutic classes, with particular concentrations in the areas of unmet medical need
preferred by drug regulators and the market. Fifth, while patent protection under the
linkage regime is specific to a particular submission, the data suggest that firms are well

74
Celecoxib is a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory used in the treatment of osteoarthritis, rheumatoid
arthritis, pain, menstruation, colonic and rectal polyps. Marketed by Pfizer as Celebrex™, it is a selective
noncompetitive inhibitor of cyclooxygenase-2 (COX-2) enzyme.
75
Bouchard, Regulation, supra note 65.
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poised to leverage loopholes in operation of the regulations supporting a paradoxical drug
approval-drug patenting linkage.
¶78
Finally, data on PR-NOC/c and NOC/c approvals indicate that the linkage regime
represents a highly flexible tool in the hands of sophisticated firms. Combined with
relatively low evidentiary thresholds for certain types of new and follow-on drug
approvals, the speed of patent listing and relatively low relevance requirements for listing
enable pharmaceutical firms to rapidly identify attractive drug targets for legal protection,
even during the regulatory approval stage. Together, the results show that the existing
drug approval system, traditional patent law, and the emerging linkage regime operate in
an interdependent and iterative manner to provide a strong mechanism for pharmaceutical
firms to efficiently identify attractive drug candidates for intellectual property rights
protection at all stages of development, including drugs about to come off patent
protection, drugs moving through the regulatory approval stage, and drugs that are
currently in development.
A. Drug Patenting
¶79

The data demonstrate that the patent regime is heavily utilized by pharmaceutical
firms in order to legally protect attractive drug candidates. This includes drugs that
already have strong market value (Most Profitable) as well as drugs that underwent some
form of expedited approval in the hopes they would (Priority Review; NOC/c; PRNOC/c). As illustrated in Fig 2a, the average drug in the Cohort was associated with a
very large number of patents (3,850), corresponding to a patent per drug ratio of 40:1.
These patents were issued over a substantial term of close to 35 years, with the most
rapid patenting occurring over a comparatively short time frame (1997-2004; Fig. 2a).
Averaged patenting activity exhibited a significant plateau over an eight year period after
the year of first instance (Fig. 2b). During this time, peak patenting was maintained at an
average of about 2.5 patents per drug per year.
¶80
The data in Figs. 3 and 4 strongly suggest there were multiple phases of patenting
activity. Fits to the data suggest there were at least two components, a slower and smaller
amplitude component up to 1993 and a faster and larger amplitude component following
1993. More specifically, the amount of patenting was approximately 2.5 times greater
and 2.0 times faster in between 1993-2001 than patenting patterns from 1977-1993. The
break in patenting activity in 1993 correlates well with the effective date of the domestic
linkage regulations regime. As such, the data indicate the linkage regulations regime
itself has significantly influenced patenting activity by pharmaceutical firms.
¶81
A related observation was that overall patenting activity for the Cohort exhibited a
steady decline in the time taken to achieve peak patenting per drug over the term 19772000 (Fig. 5). Indeed, there was a threefold increase in the rate of peak patenting per
drug over the test period. Together, the data in Figs 2-5 suggest that pharmaceutical
firms have become increasingly efficient at using the patent regime over the last three
decades.
¶82
Data in Fig. 6 and Tables 5-7 illustrate that the Cohort was associated with a
substantial array of patent classifications and WHO drug classifications. There were
5,859 individual patent classifications on the Cohort. This yielded an average of close to
62 classifications per marketed drug. These were distributed widely across functional
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patent types, with particular concentrations for Combination Therapy, Use and
Administration patents, and a second large grouping for Chemical and Process patents.
As already noted, the two main regulatory mechanisms underpinning a paradoxical drug
approval-drug patent linkage are the wide definition of a New Active Substance (NAS)
and the wide scope of uses and chemical derivatives permitted under the Supplementary
New Drug Submission (SNDS) stream.
¶83
As noted earlier, a NAS may include isomers, derivatives, or salts of chemical
substances already approved for sale or biological substances previously approved but
differing in molecular structure, nature of the source material or even manufacturing
process. 76 Similarly, an SNDS may be filed for changes to a drug that is already
marketed by a sponsor, including minor changes to dosage, strength, formulation,
manufacture, labeling, route of administration, or use/indication. Therefore, it is
noteworthy that the three largest patent classes for the Cohort were combination
therapies, uses and routes of administrations. Each of these patent classifications lends
itself well to follow-on drug development. It may also be observed that the patent
classification typically thought to underwrite breakthrough drug development, Chemical
patents, represented the smallest fraction of classifications studied.
¶84
The patent classification data reported here demonstrate that the patent pool
supporting submissions directed either to a NAS or the SNDS approval stream is very
large indeed. Importantly, these patents can also be used to prohibit generic entry on
already approved drugs via the patent listing provisions. Thus, the broad patent
classifications observed here can be used to (1) support follow-on drug development and
(2) prevent generic entry on drugs that are already on the market and coming off patent.
¶85
Figures 6b-d and related tables show that there was a wide range of WHO
therapeutic classes represented by the Cohort. Nevertheless, the majority (81 of 95) of
drugs were located in the Antineoplastic/Immunomodulator, Alimentary Tract &
Metabolism, Cardiovascular, Systemic Anti-infective, and Nervous System
classifications. The distribution of drugs (Fig. 6a), and patents associated with them (Fig.
6c), in the Cohort are similar to recent data reported for domestic ethical sales by
therapeutic class. 77 As illustrated by comparison data in Table 10, the top therapeutic
classes by ethical sales were Cardiovascular, Psychotherapeutics, Gastro-Intestinal,
Oncology, Arthritics, Bronchial, Analgesics, Neurological and Anti-infectives.
Assuming it is reasonable to fold lipid lowering drugs into the Cardiovascular class,
psychotropics within the Neurological class, and analgesics within the Anti-Arthritic
class, the top seven therapeutic classes by domestic ethical purchase strongly track the
top six WHO ATC therapeutic classes observed in this study. When developing high
value drugs, pharmaceutical firms are therefore ensuring strong representation of drug
candidates and associated patents in therapeutic classes that are already well established
in the market, with a smaller but still significant fraction in the areas of unmet medical
need associated with Priority Review and NOC/c approvals..

76

Health Canada, New Active Substances Letter, supra note 58; Health Canada NOC Database
Terminology, supra note 58.
77
IMS CONSULTING, CANADIAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY REVIEW 64-65 (2008).
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TABLE 10. COMPARISON OF THERAPEUTIC RANKINGS FOR ETHICAL SALES
AND WHO CLASSIFICATIONS.
RANK

THERAPEUTIC CLASS
(ETHICAL PURCHASE)

RANK

THERAPEUTIC CLASS
(THIS STUDY)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Cardiovascular
Anti-Lipidemic
Psychotherapeutics
Gastro-Intestinal
Oncology
Anti-Arthritics
Bronchial
Analgesics
Neurological
Anti-Infectives

1
2
3
3
4
5
6
7
7
7

Antineoplastic
Cardiovascular
Nervous System
Ant-Infectives
Alimentary
Respiratory
Musculo-Skeletal
Sensory
Blood
Various

B. Drug Approval-Drug Patenting Linkage
¶86

Data reported here show strong and increasing use of linkage regulations by
pharmaceutical firms in order to restrain generic competition. Listing of patents for the
Cohort on the patent register was generally bell-shaped in nature and began shortly after
the linkage regulations came into force in 1993 (Fig. 2a). The most rapid phase of listing
occurred between 2000 and 2005. The data further demonstrate a strong degree of
convergence between cumulative patenting and cumulative patenting listing over time.
Indeed, data relating to the temporal lag between drug approval, drug patenting and
patent listing (Fig. 2d) suggest that patent listing may be a better proxy for drug
development and approval than drug patenting per se. As illustrated in previous work, 78
while the total fraction of patents granted on the Cohort listed was relatively small (5%),
strategic staggering of patent listing over time by pharmaceutical firms can more than
double the effective period of patent protection for high value drugs.
¶87
We also obtained data potentially relevant to a paradoxical drug approval-drug
patenting linkage. While firms have available to them two avenues for leveraging this
type of linkage (new and follow-on submissions), data reported here combined with that
in our earlier work demonstrate that this pathway is being primarily utilized only for
follow-on drugs. This finding is consistent with the general focus of pharmaceutical
firms on incremental innovation and technology appropriation and away from
breakthrough drug development. 79 That firms may be obtaining the most extensive patent
protection on drugs with the least innovative value is an important observation given the
original policy intent in enacting the NOC Regulations to balance patent enforcement
over new and innovative drugs with the timely market entry of generic drugs. 80 A related
78

Bouchard, Regulation, supra note 65.
For a general discussion of how the data support a “more with less” theme in pharmaceutical
innovation, see Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 48.
80
See RIAS and Government Guidance Documents to this effect, supra note 11. The Supreme Court of
Canada has held that RIASs are proper evidence of legislative intent. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v.
Canada, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 533, 2005 SCC 26, ¶¶ 47, 156-57 (Can.) (noting that, because “[i]t has long been
79
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observation is that the linkage regime was intended to operate in accordance with
established principles of patent law and to further the societal imperative of encouraging
the development of novel medical therapies. 81 That private firms may be obtaining
extended patent protection for weakly inventive products while at the same time generic
competition is chilled and public are deprived of reasonably priced pharmaceuticals
raises the possibility that the quid pro quo of the traditional patent bargain is breached,
yielding a result that would be at odds with legislative intent. The implication of our
empirical data for the vires of the NOC Regulations is the subject of additional work by
our group. 82
C. System Flexibility and “Rights Layering”
¶88

The data in the later half of the Article illustrate that, in combination, the
evidentiary requirements for drug approval, drug patenting under the traditional patent
system and drug patenting and listing under the emerging linkage regime provide
pharmaceutical firms with a large degree of flexibility in layering intellectual property
rights on high value drugs in a manner that is both absolute and strongly context-specific.
¶89
A dominant pattern emerged when patenting and patent listing data for the Most
Profitable, Priority Review, NOC/c and PR-NOC/c groups were analysed. Patenting
activity expressed per calendar year was generally bell-shaped and skewed to the left
(Figs. 7a and 8a) and cumulative patenting and patent listing data were well fit by
sigmoidal functions (Figs. 7b and 7c). The strongest patenting activity occurred between
1998 and 2003 (Fig. 8b), while the strongest listing activity occurred later, between 2000
and 2005 (Fig. 8c). The time lag between drug approval and cumulative patent listing
was much reduced compared to cumulative patenting or patenting activity expressed per
calendar year (Figs. 9a-9d). Finally, there was a wide distribution of patent
classifications for all groups, with a similar “W”-shaped pattern and similar classification
peaks (Fig. 11). This suggests that pharmaceutical firms are leveraging a harmonized
drug development, patenting and patent listing strategy for all groups studied.
¶90
Despite these similarities, however, there were significant differences between
groups that are revealing. As illustrated in Fig. 7, peak patenting, cumulative patenting
and cumulative listing were much greater for Most Profitable and Priority Review drugs
compared to either NOC/c or PR-NOC/c drugs. Approximately 80% of all patents and
listed patents were associated with the Most Profitable and Priority Review groups. Of
interest, these two groups also displayed the most leftward skewing in the distribution of
total patenting activity (Fig. 8) and the earliest onset of cumulative patenting (Fig. 8b)
and cumulative patent listing (Fig. 8c) activity. By contrast, patenting activity per year
was much more symmetrical for both NOC/c and PR-NOC/c groups (Figs. 8a and 13),
and cumulative patenting and patent listing was shifted to the right in both groups (Figs.
8b, 8c and 13), with PR-NOC/c drugs being shifted farthest to the right. The general
established that the usage of admissible extrinsic sources regarding a provision's legislative history and its
context of enactment could be examined,” “it is useful to examine the RIAS, prepared as part of the
regulatory process”).
81
C. Gaz., Vol. 138. No. 50. (Dec. 11, 2004).
82
See Ron A. Bouchard, I’m Still Your Baby: Canada’s Continuing Support of U.S. Linkage Regime for
Pharmaceuticals, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1537988.
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order of Most Profitable>Priority Review>NOC/c>PR-NOC/c was repeated when
differences in peak patenting per drug over time were assessed. As one moved
progressively through this spectrum, peak patenting occurred in progressively fewer
years after the date of patent first instance and this peak was progressively lower in
number (Fig. 10). That the Most Profitable group would have the greatest patenting,
patent listing, patent classification values is not surprising given that this group of drugs
has already been identified by the market as highly profitable. This is corroborated by
the fact that this group had the earliest average patent priority date (Table 4) and
cumulative patenting and patent listing activity.
¶91
Differences in the data are consistent with the observation that one group (Most
Profitable) has already reached “high value” status, while the remaining three (Priority
Review, NOC/c, PR-NOC/c) were more recently approved in the hopes they would do so.
Thus, it is not surprising that the Most Profitable group had the strongest and earliest
patenting and patent listing trends (Figs. 7 and 8). Of interest, there was a 5 year gap
between the mid-point of normalized patenting for the four sub-groups studied (Fig. 8a)
which declined to only two years for cumulative patent listing (Fig. 8b). This
corresponded to the observation that the lag between approval and patenting and patent
listing was tightest for NOC/c and PR-NOC/c approvals compared to Most Profitable,
with Priority Review in between (Fig. 9). Combined, the data demonstrate a strong
degree of responsiveness by both regulators and firms to regulatory signals suggesting a
drug candidate may be a high value drug.
¶92
A second major contributing factor for differences between the Priority Review,
NOC/c and PR-NOC/c groups is the issue of post-market evidentiary requirements. For
instance, we observed stronger and earlier patenting and patent listing for Priority Review
compared to NOC/c and PR-NOC/c groups (Figs 7 and 8). It may be recalled that
Priority Review represents a pathway for expedited review with no change in pre-market
evidentiary requirements, whereas NOC/c and PR-NOC/c approvals entail significant
post-market safety and efficacy reporting requirements. While the Priority review group
had about three times the patenting activity and patent listing than either NOC/c group
(Fig. 7), it is noteworthy that the speed of patenting and, particularly, patent listing were
very similar in the three groups (Fig. 8), indicating that firms can make up lost ground
when regulatory signals favouring drug approval arise.
¶93
Considerations such as these also likely inform data pertaining to differences in
peak patenting per drug when expressed as year after first instance (Fig 10). The largest
peak (~100 patents per drug, peaking 20 years after first instance) was observed for the
Most Profitable group, which corresponded to data for patenting activity over time (Fig.
7). This was followed by Priority Review (~75 patent per drug, peaking 17 years after
first instance), NOC/c (~40 patents per drug, peaking 10 years after first instance) and
then PR-NOC (~25 patents per drug, peaking 8-9 years after first instance) groups. The
fact that peak patenting for the Most Profitable group was earliest for patenting activity
compared to all other groups analysed and latest for peak patenting per drug is likely
explained by the lack of regulatory lag for approval and post-market obligations and the
accrual of an established market for Most Profitable drugs. On this basis, it is not
surprising that Priority Review group had the next fastest patenting per group cycle and
that the two NOC/c groups had the fastest patenting cycles. Priority Review involves no
additional post-market evidentiary obligations whereas NOC/c approvals do and
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therefore the market has time to solidify earlier. Thus, the diminished and faster NOC/c
and PR-NOC/c patenting per drug data simply reflect the ongoing nature of approval and
patenting for these groups.
¶94
The data described thus far also demonstrate that firms are able to identify
attractive drug candidates early in the approval process. At this point, firms begin the
process of layering patents, listing patents on the patent register, and obtaining further
patents with broad classifications to expand the boundary of legal protection afforded by
the patent and linkage regulation regimes. This, in turn, allows firms to fill coffers with
candidates for later NDS and SNDS submissions. It is worth pointing out that the linkage
regime in combination with the existing drug regulatory regime has proven to be a highly
flexible tool in the hands of sophisticated pharmaceutical firms. The combination of the
speed of patent listing compared with patenting and the relatively low relevance
requirement for listing has enabled pharmaceutical firms to rapidly identify attractive
drug targets for legal protection even during the regulatory approval stage. This goal is
supported by the large number of patents and patent classifications observed here and the
wide berth in regulatory requirements for approval of NAS and SNDS drugs.
¶95
The group that best exemplifies the flexibility of the drug approval-drug patenting
linkage is the combined PR-NOC/c group. This category represents perhaps the best bet
of pharmaceutical sponsors in the high risk stakes of drug development. It offers the
most favourable balance of expedited review with minimally intrusive post-marketing
obligations for therapeutic niches with known demand. Composed of the smallest
number of drugs in the Cohort, the characteristics of this group differed substantially for
almost all metrics studied when the data were normalized. For example, while the PRNOC/c group had by far the lowest number of drugs (n=6) with the lowest number of
patents (n=379), listed patents (n=11), and patent classifications (n=502), when averaged
out for the number of drugs per group each of these metrics was the highest, or next to
the highest, among the groups. PR-NOC/c drugs had an average of 63 patents per drug
(Table 4), 2% of which were listed on the patent register. The average number of patents
was 56% greater than the next highest group, represented by Most Profitable drugs.
¶96
While 2% listed patents is lower than listing percentages for the other groups (Most
Profitable, 5.96%; Priority Review, 4.34%; NOC/c, 5.94%), it is noteworthy that the
average patent date for PR-NOC/c drugs was almost two years later than that for the
Cohort or Most Profitable groups (Table 4). As such, both conventional patent protection
and linkage regulation protection would be extended by 3 to 5 years compared to other
groups studied. An extra period of patent protection of this nature is not inconsiderable,
as is now recognized in the context of both brand-name and generic first mover status.
The PR-NOC/c group also had the smallest drug approval to patenting/patent listing lag
differential (Fig. 9), with both 50th and 100th percentile patent listing occurring prior to
the average date of drug approval. Therefore, the regulatory lag for PR-NOC/c drugs
would be reduced correspondingly. Finally, PR-NOC/c drugs had 83.7 patent
classifications per drug (Fig. 11; Tables 5 and 6). Notwithstanding the smaller range of
WHO ATC classifications compared to other groups (Fig. 12), this would open a large
patent pool to underpin future patent listing efforts to delay generic competition via
linkage regulations as well as to support future follow-on drug development via the
conventional patent system. The closest group in each of these metrics was the NOC/c
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group, which represents the group with the least amount of pre-market evidentiary
requirements in exchange for expedited review compared to the PR-NOC/c group.
¶97
As illustrated in Fig. 12, there were also differences in the profiles of WHO
therapeutic classes between groups. Of particular interest is the observation that the
requirements for (a) effective treatment, prevention or diagnosis of a disease, (b)
evidence of a significant increase in safety and efficacy or decrease in risk such that
overall risk-benefit profile is improved, and (c) examples offered by regulators of what
constitutes a serious or life-threatening disease and a severely debilitating disease for
NOC/c 83 and Priority Review 84 approvals appear to be very similar, despite substantial
differences in therapeutic classification data for these groups (Fig. 12). Data for Priority
Review were well distributed throughout all 10 ATC classes with concentrations in the
groups discussed above. By contrast, the distribution of classes for both the NOC/c and
PR-NOC/c were highly curtailed and narrowly distributed amongst Antineoplastic and
Immunomodulatory, Systemic Anti-infective, Nervous System and Musculo-Skeletal
classifications. While one might assume that Most Profitable drugs differ from Priority
Review and NOC/c groups due to the possibility that the most profitable and/or
innovative drug development may occur outside of regulatory preferences or unmet
medical need, there is no clear explanation for the observed differences between NOC/c
and Priority Review groups at present. A partial explanation may be that trends for the
two groups have reversed over the last decade, with a cross over point around 2005. 85
D. Implications for Global Drug Development & Regulation
¶98

While our study was based on domestic Canadian data, we argue that the results are
significant within the global context of drug regulatory reform and innovation policy.
First, almost all major pharmaceutical companies are headquartered in either the United
States or the European Union. 86 Products in smaller markets such as Canada therefore
reflect therapeutic product development and intellectual property strategies of
multinational firms rather than domestic firms. Secondly, efforts have been underway for
some time to harmonize the goals and mechanisms of drug regulation globally. Over the
last decade, regulators in Canada have harmonized their regulatory approval requirements
to parallel those of the U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) and its European
counterpart (EMEA), a trend that will only gain traction as jurisdictions embrace the
principles of lifecycle-based regulation. 87 Third, global systems of translational research
and national science and technology policy are closely integrated and likewise mirror one
another, in large part due to the success of the U.S. biotechnology enterprise. 88 Fourth,

83

HEALTH CANADA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE WITH CONDITIONS (NOC/C)
(2006), available at http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/hpfb-dgpsa/pdf/prodpharma/noccg_accdeng.pdf [hereinafter NOC/c Guidance Document].
84
See also HEALTH CANADA, PRIORITY REVIEW OF DRUG SUBMISSIONS (2007), available at
http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/alt_formats/hpfb-dgpsa/pdf/prodpharma/noccg_accd-eng.pdf.
85
See Sawicka & Bouchard, supra note 48.
86
BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 9, at 241.
87
See Hans-Georg Eichler et al., Balancing Early Market Access to New Drugs With the Need for
Benefit/Risk Data: A Mounting Dilemma, 7 NATURE REVS. DRUG DISCOVERY 818, 823-24 (2008);
Bouchard & Sawicka, supra note 49.
88
Sheila Jasanoff, The Life Sciences and the Rule of Law, 319 J. MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 891 (2002).
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qualitative trends in approval of new and follow-on drugs track one another fairly closely
in most major jurisdictions, and the drug patents that we analyzed represent high value
drugs not only in Canada, but also in U.S. and E.U. markets. Given that the already small
number of multinational pharmaceutical corporations responsible for global drug
innovation are doing so increasingly in partnership with drug regulators, 89 it is reasonable
to speculate that drug development and regulation is steadily converging upon a risk
management philosophy whereby critical benefit-risk calculations for product
development are made based on legal incentives provided for by regulators. 90
¶99
Importantly, our findings do not indicate abnormal behavior by pharmaceutical
companies. Rather, the data lend themselves to the conclusions that the pharmaceutical
industry has engaged in very effective intellectual property lobbying over the last two
decades and that these lobbying efforts have increasingly informed the drug development
strategies of multinational pharmaceutical companies. As acknowledged by the Supreme
Court of Canada, it is perfectly acceptable that pharmaceutical firms avail themselves of
loopholes that allow product evergreening after the original patent has expired under
conditions where the government has made, and continues to make, such loopholes
available. 91
VI. SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS
¶100

The present work was designed to empirically investigate two related phenomenon
within the context of emerging linkage regime models of intellectual property protection.
The first was to probe the linkage between drug approval and patent listing for high value
pharmaceuticals. While the patent regime has for decades been claimed by both
pharmaceutical firms and regulators to be integral for innovative drug development, the
role of drug approval-drug patenting linkage in this process is unclear. Indeed, a growing
cache of empirical studies of the patenting behaviour of large pharmaceutical firms
suggests that pharmaceutical firms have become highly adept at leveraging legal and
regulatory opportunities offered to them favouring low risk high reward drug products.
Empirical evidence relating to drug approval-drug patenting linkage would therefore be
valuable at a time when jurisdictions other than the U.S. and Canada are contemplating
bringing into force similar provisions. A second consideration was to address how
certain characteristics of the existing regulatory approval scheme, such as the relatively
low threshold for NAS status and approval via the SNDS stream and provisions relating
89

See generally Mary E. Wiktorowicz, Emergent Patterns in the Regulation of Pharmaceuticals:
Institutions and Interests in the United States, Canada, Britain, and France, 28 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y &
L. 615 (2003).
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Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, typically referred to as the OECD. See
generally http://www.oecd.org/home/0,2987,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1,00.html.
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Discussing the general relevance requirement articulated by the Federal Court of Appeal in Eli Lilly
Canada Inc. v. Canada 2003 FCA 24, Justice Binnie has stated:
Given the evident (and entirely understandable) commercial strategy of the innovative
drug companies to evergreen their products by adding bells and whistles to a pioneering
product even after the original patent for that pioneering product has expired, the decision
of the Federal Court of Appeal would reward evergreening even if the generic
manufacturer (and thus the public) does not thereby derive any benefit from the
subsequently listed patents). AstraZeneca Can., Inc. v. Canada, [2006] S.C.R. 560, 2006
SCC 52, ¶ 39 (Can.).
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to expedited approval for drugs might be linked to firm patenting and patent listing
patterns. Accordingly, we investigated patent and therapeutic classes preferred by firms
in their efforts to support new and follow-on drug development. Of particular interest
was to obtain objective data relating to the possibility that firms might be leveraging
loopholes in the regulatory and legislative structure underpinning the linkage regime in
favour of a paradoxical drug approval-drug patenting linkage. That is, whether firms may
be obtaining the greatest intellectual property protection for products with the least
innovative value and smallest development costs.
Our analysis of drug approvals, drug patenting and patent listing under the domestic
linkage regulation regime demonstrates strong, increasing and faster utilization of both
traditional patent law and emerging linkage regulation regimes by pharmaceutical firms.
There were a large number of patents, patent classifications and therapeutic classes for
every drug studied. Moreover, firms are listing a significant number of these patents in
order to delay generic entry. The results also demonstrate that pharmaceutical companies
are becoming increasingly efficient at both patenting and patent listing over time.
Indeed, results such as those presented here suggest that the legal protection afforded by
the combination of traditional patent law and novel linkage regulations creates an
unprecedented legal mechanism that simultaneously protects existing high value drug
products from generic competition and allows for further follow-on drug development.
As discussed here and elsewhere, 92 there is a wide berth for the definition of a New
Active Substance (NAS) under domestic food and drug law and the type of chemicals and
uses allowed under the supplemental, or SNDS, drug approval stream. The definition of
a NAS is important as it determines whether a drug will be classified as a “First in Class”
or “Me Too” drug, with correlated market price differentials and regulatory preferences.
Similarly, the specific combination of chemical structure and use dictates whether a drug
is approved via either the “new” or “follow-on” NDS or SNDS approval streams. Of
relevance to the present study, a broad range of patent classifications would support a
range of high reward low risk product development strategies relating to both new and
follow-on drug development.
Not surprisingly, the functional scope of patent classifications identified in this
work was substantial, and encompassed a wide range of chemical, use, combination,
process, and administration/delivery patents. Similarly, both patents and drugs in the
cohort studied were directed to an equally broad scope of therapeutic classes, with
particular concentrations in the areas of unmet medical need preferred by drug regulators
and the marketplace. Combined, the broad scope of patent type and therapeutic
classifications observed here have the potential to support a vast array of new and followon drugs, including those meeting the requirements of First in Class drugs approved in
the less onerous follow-on SNDS approval stream.
Finally, the evidence reported here suggests that the linkage regime provides a
highly flexible tool in the hands of sophisticated pharmaceutical firms. The number and
array of patent types, the speed of patent listing, the automatic injunction, and the low
relevance requirement for listing combined with low evidentiary requirements for new
(NAS) and follow-on (SNDS) drug development enable pharmaceutical firms to rapidly
identify attractive drug targets for legal protection both during and after regulatory
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approval. This property of the linkage regulation regime is demonstrated most
effectively by the unique patenting, patent listing and patent classifications of drugs
receiving the PR-NOC/c designation. Similar trends were observed with NOC/c and
Priority Review groups, but to a lesser extent.
¶105
Together, the results reported here show that the combination of conventional
patent law, emerging linkage regulation regimes and existing drug approval framework
provide a powerful mechanism for multinational pharmaceutical firms to efficiently and
effectively identify attractive new and follow-on drug candidates for market exclusivity.
The linkage regulation regime in particular has proven to be an excellent vehicle for firms
to obtain extended legal protection on drugs at all stages of development, including drugs
about to come off patent protection, drugs moving through the regulatory approval stage,
and drugs that are currently in development.
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